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NICHOLS v. UNITED STATES:
USING PRIOR, UNCOUNSELED MISDEMEANOR
CONVICTIONS TO ENHANCE SENTENCES
A DISPUTE RESOLVED
I. INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is one of the linchpin rights
contained in the Bill of Rights.' In recognition of its pivotal role, the
United States Supreme Court extended the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel to the states for the first time more than thirty years ago.2 Like
many other Constitutional provisions, the parameters of the right to coun-
sel have changed over the years, mirroring the changes in the personalities
and policies of the Supreme Court.3 Since the end of the Warren era,
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment reads in pertinent part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the
Assistance of Counsel for his [or her] defence." Id.; see ALFREDO GARCIA, THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1992) ("The Sixth
Amendment occupies a pivotal role in the panoply of rights accorded criminal
defendants through the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution.").
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963). Gideon represents the
first case in which the Sixth Amendment was truly incorporated into the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. at 342-43. Although prior to Gideon,
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), had held that four state defendants were
entitled to have counsel appointed for their defense, the Powell Court based its
decision solely on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds, rather than the
incorporation of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel into the Fourteenth
Amendment. Powell 287 U.S. at 71-73; see WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 34 (1955) ("The Supreme Court would appear to
have merely applied to the states through the due-process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment the same requirement which a federal statute had since 1790 im-
posed on federal courts in capital cases."); FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMEND-
MENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 123-24 (1969) (stating that
Supreme Court "found that its problem was to determine whether, under the cir-
cumstances of the case, the trial court's failure to make an effective appointment
of counsel constituted a denial of due process"). Thus, the Supreme Court in
Powell neither redefined the Sixth Amendment, nor applied it to the states. HEE-
LER, supra, at 124. In subsequent cases, however, the Supreme Court implied that
Powell had indeed been based upon the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. Id. at
124-26. For a complete discussion of Gideon, see infra notes 54-61 and accompany-
ing text. For a complete discussion of the Powell decision, see infra notes 22-33 and
accompanying text.
3. Compare Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (holding that Due Process
Clause does not require application of Sixth Amendment right to counsel to
states), overruled by Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335 with Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335 (extending
right to counsel to states through Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause);
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (defining right to counsel broadly and
extending it to misdemeanor defendants who are actually incarcerated) and Scott
v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (defining right to counsel narrowly and limiting
Argersinger to only those defendants who are actually incarcerated, rather than au-
thorized to be incarcerated); see also GARCIA, supra note 1, at 1-2 (noting that ex-
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commentators have generally perceived the Supreme Court as retracting
the protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment. 4 The Supreme Court
last term lent credence to such perceptions when it handed down its deci-
sion in Nichols v. United States,5 holding that prior, uncounseled misde-
meanor convictions may be used to enhance a subsequent penalty.
6
In Nichols, the Court held that a sentencing court could use a defend-
ant's prior, uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance a sentence.
7
The defendant in Nichols pled guilty to a drug distribution charge.8 Dur-
ing sentencing, Nichols was assessed an additional twenty-five months in
prison under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) be-
cause of his prior, uncounseled misdemeanor conviction for driving under
the influence. 9 The Guidelines include a system for penalizing recidivism,
even if the conviction was based on misdemeanor charges. 10 Nichols raised
pansive view of Sixth Amendment rights taken by Warren Court has been replaced
by Burger and Rehnquist Courts' more restrictive view). See generally RICHARD L.
PACELLE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S AGENDA 193-206 (1991)
(providing excellent discussion of shifting views of Court with respect to Sixth
Amendment right to counsel).
4. See GARciA, supra note 1, at 1 ("The promise of an expansive interpretation
of the amendment engendered by the Warren Court has given way to a fundamen-
tally different conception. As a result, both the functional and symbolic roles of
the amendment have been steadily eroded."); Samuel Rosenthal & Michelle Rice,
Whittling Away the Right to Counsel, CRiM. JUST., Fall 1988, at 2. See generally PACELLE,
supra note 3, at 193-206 (discussing Burger and Rehnquist Court's more restrictive
view of Sixth Amendment right to counsel). Even Justices of the Supreme Court
have had occasion to lash out in dissent against holdings they perceived as narrow-
ing the scope of previous holdings. Scott, 440 U.S. at 389 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
In Scott, Justice Brennan did just that in reaction to what he believed was the major-
ity's reinterpretation of the Court's holding in Argersinger. Id. (Brennan,J., dissent-
ing) (stating that majority's opinion unconscionably "restricts the right to counsel"
in effect "turn [ing] the reasoning of Argersinger on its head"). For a full discussion
of Scott, see infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
5. 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
6. Id. at 1932 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (stating that although Court has long
grappled with Sixth Amendment rights, "it has never permitted, before now, an
uncounseled conviction to serve as the basis for any jail time").
7. Id. at 1928. The Nichols Court expressly overruled its decision fourteen
years earlier in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980), overruled by Nichols v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994). For a discussion of the rationale in Nichols,
see infra notes 99-110 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Baldasar, see
infra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
8. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924.
9. Id. at 1924-25. The maximum sentence that could have been given under
the Guidelines was 235 months. Id. at 1924. Had the prior, uncounseled misde-
meanor conviction not been included in the pre-sentence Report, then the maxi-
mum sentence allowable under the Guidelines would have been 210 months. Id.
The sentencing court gave Nichols the maximum term of 235 months. Id. at 1925.
10. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES, GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 4, pt. A.
intro, comment (Nov. 1994) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. The Guidelines state the basis
for the government's policy of penalizing recidivism:
A defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpa-
ble than a first offender and thus deserving of greater punishment. Gen-
eral deterrence of criminal conduct dictates that a clear message be sent
[Vol. 40: p. 475
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the issue of whether the Guidelines under the Sixth Amendment could be
extended to increase incarceration even when the defendant was uncoun-
seled during his previous misdemeanor conviction.1 1 Given the popular-
ity of recidivist statutes in the states and the consideration of recidivism in
the Guidelines, Nichols is an important decision. 12
This Note begins by examining the conflict among both courts and
commentators surrounding the Supreme Court decision in Baldasar v. Illi-
nois,13 the splintered decision that, prior to Nichols, "controlled" the issue
of whether prior, uncounseled convictions could be used to enhance sub-
sequent penalties. 14 Section II provides an analysis of the Sixth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, including the Supreme Court's
Sixth Amendment decisions through Baldasar, the decision Nichols over-
ruled. 15 Section III of the Note presents the facts of Nichols and an exami-
nation of the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions. 16 Then,
section IV analyzes the Justices' rationale. 17 Finally, section V outlines the
immediate impact of Nichols upon the lower courts and criminal defend-
ants. 18 This section concludes with an examination of whether we can
to society that repeated criminal behavior will aggravate the need for
punishment with each recurrence. To protect the public from further
crimes of the particular defendant, the likelihood of recidivism and fu-
ture criminal behavior must be considered.
Id.
A simple definition of the Guidelines' method of taking recidivism into ac-
count was provided in the majority's opinion in Nichols
The Sentencing Table provides a matrix of sentencing ranges. On the
vertical axis of the matrix is the defendant's offense level representing the
seriousness of the crime; on the horizontal axis is the defendant's crimi-
nal history category. The sentencing range is determined by identifying
the intersection of the defendant's offense level and his [or her] criminal
history category.
Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924 n.3 (citing U.S.S.G., supra, ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing
Table)).
11. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924.
12. Other statutes or judicial decisions allow other collateral uses for criminal
convictions. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 n.11 (1972) (listing
wide range of civil disabilities that may result from misdemeanor convictions). For
a general discussion of recidivist statutes, including the Sentencing Guidelines, see
D. Brian King, Sentence Enhancement Based on Unconstitutional Prior Convictions, 64
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1373 (1989).
. 13. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam), overruled by Nichols v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
14. For a discussion of the split among the circuit and state courts before
Nichols, see infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the original intent of the Sixth Amendment, see infra
notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the facts in Nichols, see infra notes 87-98 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of the opinions in Nichols, see infra notes 99-136 and
accompanying text.
17. For a critique of the Supreme Court's opinion, see infra notes 137-61 and
accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Nichols,
see infra notes 151-52 & 160 and accompanying text.
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discern a meaningful trend in order to predict the future of the Sixth
Amendment's right to counsel. 19
II. BACKGROUND
A. Original Intent, Early Decisions and Betts v. Brady
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel was originally intended to
protect a defendant's right in federal court to have whatever representa-
tion he or she could afford or arrange.20 The United States Supreme
Court, however, has expanded the Sixth Amendment to include the right
of indigent defendants to appointed counsel despite any original intent
arguments to the contrary.2 1
Over sixty years ago, the Supreme Court first found that the govern-
ment may be required to provide counsel for indigent defendants in Powell
v. Alabama.22 Powell, also known as the "Scottsboro case," involved the
charging of several black youths (the "Scottsboro boys") with the rape of
two white girls.23 The indictment was handed down six days' after the
crime was supposed to have been committed and the trial began six days
after that.24 The trial court "appointed all the members of the bar" to
19. For a discussion of discernable Supreme Court trends in interpreting the
Sixth Amendment, see infra notes 151-61 and accompanying text. See generally GA-
CIA, supra note 1 (discussing Burger and Rehnquist Courts' contraction of Sixth
Amendment rights).
20. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979). The Court noted that
[t] here is considerable doubt that the Sixth Amendment itself, ... contemplated
any guarantee other than the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution in a
federal court to employ a lawyer to assist in his defense." Id. (citing BEANEY, supra
note 2, at 27-30); see also HELLER, supra note 2, at 110 (discussing original intent of
framers in adopting Sixth Amendment); Stephen G. Gilles, Effective Assistance of
Counsel: The Sixth Amendment and the Fair Trial, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1380, 1388
(1983) (same).
The Sixth Amendment mirrored a right present in twelve of the original thir-
teen states' constitutions. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-65 (1932). It was also
a reaction to English common law, which originally denied counsel to certain de-
fendants. Id. at 60; see BRUCE A. GREEN, LETHAL FICTION: THE MEANING OF "COUN-
SEL" IN THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 433, 438 (1993) ("The principal purpose of the
Sixth Amendment right... [to counsel] was to forbid laws, like those in England,
which required criminal defendants to represent themselves.").
21. SeeJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-69 (1938) (extending right to
appointed counsel to all federal felony prosecutions). Zerbst was well-noted for its
failure to even mention the original intent of the Sixth Amendment. See BEANEY,
supra note 2, at 42 ("Uustice] Black's opinion is perhaps equally notable for its...
indifference to the historical aspects of the right to counsel."). It was not until
1963, however, that the Supreme Court found the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel to be a fundamental right and therefore applicable to the states. Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
22. 287 U.S. 45, 71-73 (1932). Powell was, however, based solely on Four-
teenth Amendment due process grounds and did not purport to rely on the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Id.
23. Id. at 49.
24. Id. at 49, 53.
478 [Vol. 40: p. 475
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represent the defendants.2 5 Each of the three trials was completed in a
day and the juries found the defendants guilty, sentencing them all to the
death penalty.2 6 The Court determined that the "representation" the de-
fendants had received was merely proforma and that the defendants were
entitled to the benefit of counsel under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2 7
The Powell Court initially engaged in a lengthy historical review of the
right to counsel. 28 The Court proceeded to analyze the concept of due
process, determining that it had been denied to the defendants on the
facts before it.29 The Court also emphasized the especially unusual facts
25. Id. at 53.
26. Id. at 50. See generally JAMES E. GOODMAN, STORIES OF ScOTrsBORO (1994)
(providing full background of Scottsboro incident and effects to present).
27. Powel 287 U.S. at 53, 58. Powell's reliance solely on the Fourteenth
Amendment helped shape the evolution of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
and its application to the states. See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462-64
(1942) (emphasizing that Powell was based solely on Fourteenth Amendment
grounds and refusing to extend Sixth Amendment right to counsel to state defend-
ants accused of non-capital crimes), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963). In Gideon, the Court stated that it was returning to the philosophy of
Powell and overruled Betts, a case that limited Powell and refused to extend the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to felony defendants. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335,
342-45 ("The Court in Betts v. Brady departed from the sound wisdom upon which
the Court's holding in Powell v. Alabama rested.").
28. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69-73. The Court, per Justice Sutherland, conducted a
lengthy analysis of the history of the Sixth Amendment and its state counterparts,
before determining that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
required the appointment of counsel to Powell and his co-defendants. Id. The
Court noted that at the time of the ratification of the Constitution, England did
not allow the advice of counsel for defendants accused of non-petty crimes. Id. at
60. The Court also noted, however, that this English rule of law was vigorously
attacked by many English commentators, including Blackstone. Id. at 60-61. Fur-
ther, in the United States, at least twelve of the thirteen colonies had recognized
the right to counsel in almost all criminal prosecutions. Id. at 64-65.
29. Id. at 65-73. The Court's analysis was strictly limited to determining
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated.
Id. As previously mentioned, it is important to note that Powell did not purport to
base its decision on the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 71-73.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Similar to the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which protects against federal incursions, the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause has "two aspects: procedural, in which a person
is guaranteed fair procedures and substantive which protects a person's property
from unfair governmental interference or taking." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 500
(6th ed. 1990). Courts will find a violation of the procedural aspect of the Due
Process Clause where there has been a violation of the defendant's right to "funda-
mental fairness." Cf id. at 501 ("Aside from all else, 'due process' means funda-
mental fairness and substantial justice."). Due process "means fundamental
fairness and substantial justice" as well as "embod[ying] ... the basic rights of a
defendant in criminal proceedings and the requisites for a fair trial." Id.
The Court in Powell explained its Due Process Clause-based holding in light of
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), in which the Court held that the Fifth
Amendment right to obtain an indictment did not extend to the states, even in a
1995] NOTE
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involved before finding that the defendants' right to due process was vio-
lated. 30 The Court's emphasis of the facts involved in this particular case
and the clear tying of its decision to those facts, became very important in
determining the path of the right to counsel.3 1 Surprisingly, given the
shocking fact pattern involved, the Supreme Court failed to hand down a
unanimous decision.3 2 Despite its limiting language to both the Four-
teenth Amendment and the particular facts involved in the case, Powell
became the seminal case in providing the right to counsel, and the one
capital trial. Powell, 287 U.S. at 65-66. The Powell Court reasoned that Hurtado did
not dispose of the issue before it because the Court had previously found violations
of the Fourteenth Amendment regardless of what the Fifth Amendment allowed.
Id. at 66; see Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (holding that
state seizure of land subject to statute and judicial order still violates Due Process
Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). The Powell Court also made note of other
Supreme Court cases, and stated that " 'it is possible that some of the personal
rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also
be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of
due process of law.'" Id. at 67 (quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99
(1908)).
The Supreme Court then analyzed the concept of due process and what it
reasonably entailed. Id. at 67-68. The Court noted that "[t]he right to be heard
would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel." Id. at 68-69. The Court acknowledged that there is a greatly
increased likelihood of even an innocent defendant obtaining a conviction due to
his lack of counsel. Id. at 69. Further, Judge Cooley of England is cited as sug-
gesting that the right of counsel is "perhaps [a defendant's] most important privi-
lege," and that " '[w]ith us it is a universal principle of constitutional law that the
prisoner shall be allowed a defense by counsel.'" Id. at 70 (quoting 1 COOLEY'S
CONST. LIM. 700, 8th ed.).
30. See Powell 287 U.S. at 71. The Court stated:
In the light of the facts outlined in the forepart of this opinion-the ig-
norance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances
of public hostility, the imprisonment and the close surveillance of the
defendants by the military forces, the fact that their friends and families
were all in other states and communication with them necessarily diffi-
cult, and above all that they stood in deadly peril of their lives-we think
the failure of the trial court to give them reasonable time and opportu-
nity to secure counsel was a clear denial of due process.
Id.
31. See Betts, 316 U.S. at 462-63 (suggesting that holding in Powell was largely
based on unusual fact pattern involved). For a discussion of Betts, see infra notes
40-53 and accompanying text.
32. Powell reversed the Alabama Supreme Court, which voted 5-1 in favor of
affirming the conviction. Powell v. State, 141 So. 201 (Ala. 1932). The United
States Supreme Court was divided by a margin of seven justices to two on the reso-
lution of the issue. Powell, 287 U.S. at 49, 73. Justice Sutherland's majority opinion
was joined by Chief Justice Hughes and Justices van DeVanter, Brandeis, Stone,
Roberts and Cardozo. Justices Butler and McReynolds dissented from the major-
ity, suggesting that the facts were not nearly so bad as they appeared, and noting
that the trial court had appointed, in addition to the entire bar, one member of
the bar to act as lead counsel. Id. at 74-75 (Butler, J., dissenting). Further, the
dissent disagreed with the majority's characterization of the representation of
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that all subsequent decisions purported to rely upon.3 3
Shortly after Powell, the Court for the first time read the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel as requiring the appointment of counsel to indigent
defendants.3 4 In Johnson v. Zerbst,35 two United States Marine Corps en-
listed men were arrested and convicted of uttering and possessing counter-
feit money.3 6 The Court, after a relatively brief analysis, found that federal
defendants accused of felonies were entitled to representation by counsel
under the Sixth Amendment. 3 7 The Court's reasoning revolved around
the concern that justice will not "still be done" if defendants do not re-
ceive the benefit of counsel.3 8 Further, the Court noted Powell's recogni-
33. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) ("The Court
in Betts v. Brady departed from the sound wisdom upon which the Court's holding
in Powell v. Alabama rested."). For a discussion of Gideon, see infra notes 54-61
and accompanying text.
34. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 459. Johnson and his co-defendant Bridwell, while on leave from
the Marines, were arrested in Charleston, South Carolina. Id. at 459-60. They
were both residents of distant cities and had no friends or relatives in Charleston.
Bridwell v. Aderhold, 13 F. Supp. 253, 254 (1935), revd sub nom.,Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 (1938). Further, they were men of little education and had never
been charged with any offense before. Id. After being represented at their prelim-
inary hearing, they were unable to afford counsel for subsequent proceedings, and
were arraigned, tried and sentenced on the same day without benefit of counsel.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 460. For a lengthy discussion of the facts in Zerbst, including the
unusual circumstances of the appeal, see BENEY, supra note 2, at 36-42.
37. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 462-63. The Zerbst case was well-noted for its lack of
analysis, especially with respect to historical precedent. See BEANEY, supra note 2, at
42 (" [Justice] Black's opinion is perhaps equally notable for its matter-of-fact tone
and for its indifference to the historical aspects of the right to counsel."). The
reason for the Court's failure to provide historical analysis is quite clear, given that
if Justice Black had "used the narrow historical approach to constitutional inter-
pretation, he would [have found] it difficult to justify this decision." Id. at 44.
Further, "[i] t was obvious that this particular judicial vacuum could not be filled as
the justices wished by recourse to history." Id. at 42.
The Court's decision was, however, particularly well received:
In effect, the Court chose to adopt a more enlightened procedure be-
cause modern conditions and attitudes seemed to make such action desir-
able. It was certain to be a popular move. The criminal defendants
would appreciate it. The United States Government, speaking through
the Department ofJustice, had indicated its support for a broad and gen-
erous rule. The judges and lawyers in the majority of federal districts
would not oppose it, because their practice and custom had placed them
in most instances under such a rule. A few judges and a few attorneys
were the only possible dissidents.
Id. at 44.
38. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 462 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)). The Court's decision instead relied upon the "realistic recognition of the
obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill
to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or
liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned coun-
sel." Id. at 462-63. Justice Black's opinion, which failed to "refer[ ] to or dispos[e]
of the previously accepted meaning of the [Sixth A] mendment," was clearly driven
by this concern. HELLER, supra note 2, at 111.
1995] NOTE
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tion that the right of defendants to be heard holds little significance if it
does not "comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. '3 9
Six years later, however, in Betts v. Brady,40 the Supreme Court de-
clined to extend Zerbst to the states.41 In Betts, the defendant was accused
of robbery and was denied the assistance of counsel despite his indi-
gency.4 2 The defendant proceeded to conduct his own defense as compe-
tently as could be expected, was found guilty and was sentenced to eight
years in jail. 43 On appeal, the Supreme Court found that due process did
not entail the appointment of counsel in all state felony cases, and the
defendant was not entitled to counsel unless he could show unusual cir-
39. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 463 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69(1932)). There were two other questions faced by the Court in Zerbst, each impli-
cating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 462-69. First, the Court de-
cided that a defendant's waiver of counsel cannot be lightly assumed by the trial
court. Id. at 464-65. Although defendants may waive counsel if they wish, there is
a "serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether
... [the waiver] is intelligent and competent." Id. at 465. Second, the Court ap-
proved the use of habeas corpus to determine whether a conviction had been ob-
tained by violating the right to counsel. Id. at 465-69. Notably, the Court stated
that "a judgment cannot be lightly set aside by collateral attack, even on habeas
corpus. When collaterally attacked, the judgment of a court carries with it a pre-
sumption of regularity." Id. at 468.
Justice Black played an unusual role in Sixth Amendment right to counseljurisprudence. After writing for the Court in Zerbst, he would write the stinging
dissent six years later in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. at 474. Then, nineteen years later,
Justice Black vindicated his dissent in Betts by authoring the majority opinion in
Gideon, which overturned Betts. Gideon, 373 U.S. at 335.
Zerbst was decided by a vote of 6-2, with Justice Black being joined by Chief
Justice Hughes, and Justices Brandeis, Stone and Roberts. Justice Reed concurred
without opinion with the majority. Id. at 469. Justice McReynolds dissented with-
out opinion. Id. Justice Butler expressed his view that the record revealed that
petitioner waived the right to counsel. Id. (Butler,J., dissenting). Justice Cardozo
took no part in the case. Id.
40. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
41. Id. at 473. The Betts Court held that:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and incarcera-
tion of one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas
of fairness and right, and while want of counsel in a particular case may
result in a conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness, we cannot say
that the Amendment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for
any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded
a defendant who is not represented by counsel.
Id.
42. Id. at 456-57. Defendant was indicted in the Circuit Court of Carroll
County, Maryland. Id. at 456. Unable to afford counsel, petitioner requested
counsel at his arraignment. Id. at 456-57. The trial court refused, citing the
county practice of appointing counsel only in cases of rape or murder. Id. at 457.
43. Id. Defendant conducted his own defense without waiving his right to
counsel. Id. He plead not guilty and waived his right to trial by jury. Id. He called
witnesses, subjected them to examination and cross-examined those of the prose-
cution. Id. Defendant also declined to testify in his own behalf. Id.
[Vol. 40: p. 475
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cumstances. 44 The Betts Court, speaking through Justice Roberts, first
noted that the Sixth Amendment applied only to federal trials.4
5
The Court then engaged in a historical analysis of the right to counsel
afforded in both the Sixth Amendment and the original colonies. 46 The
Court concluded that those provisions guaranteeing the right to counsel
never encompassed or contemplated the right to have counsel appointed
by the state.4 7 Further, the Court noted that an analysis of the right to
counsel in many state statutory provisions reveals that "in the great major-
ity of the states, it has been the considered judgment of the people, their
representatives and their courts that appointment of counsel is not a fun-
damental right, essential to a fair trial. On the contrary, the matter has
generally been deemed one of legislative policy." 48 Thus, the Court found
that:
while want of counsel in a particular case may result in a convic-
tion lacking in such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the
amendment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for
any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice
accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel. 49
The Betts Court reasoned that the Powell Court had found a violation
of the Due Process Clause because it was a capital case with a highly unu-
sual fact pattern.5 0 Betts was neither a capital case nor did it involve an
extremely unusual set of circumstances such that the Due Process Clause
was violated.5 1 Justice Black wrote a vigorous dissent arguing that (1) the
Sixth Amendment should be made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment;52 and (2) even if the Court declined to apply the
Sixth Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
44. Id. at 473; see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 371 (1979) (summarizing
Betts as holding that "[a] determination had to be made in each individual case
whether failure to appoint counsel was a denial of fundamental fairness").
45. Betts, 316 U.S. at 461.
46. Id. at 465-72.
47. Id. at 466.
48. Id. at 471.
49. Id. at 473.
50. Id. at 463. The Court noted the unusual factual circumstances in Powell
and upheld the state's argument that "emphasized the holding and glossed over
the dicta in the Powell case." BEANaE, supra note 2, at 161.
51. Betts, 316 U.S. at 471-73.
52. Id. at 474-75 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black's dissent, joined byjus-
tices Douglas and Murphy, attempted to show that counsel was commonly ac-
cepted as an integral part of due process by including a lengthy appendix listing
the states that require the appointment of counsel. Id. at 477-80 (Black, J., dissent-
ing). The listed states required the appointment of counsel, either by constitu-
tional provision, statute or judicial decision, in both capital as well as non-capital
cases. Id. (Black, J., dissenting). Only two states, the dissent found, "affirmatively
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prior Fourteenth Amendment cases clearly called for counsel to be ap-
pointed in this case.5 3
B. Betts Overruled: The Right to Counsel Included in Due Process
Although Betts remained the law for nearly twenty years, the Supreme
Court overruled Betts and extended the Sixth Amendment to the states in
Gideon v. Wainwright.54 In Gideon, a defendant was charged and convicted
of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor, a felony
under Florida law. 55 The defendant requested and was denied counsel,
and then proceeded to conduct his defense as well as could be expected of
a layperson.56
In Gideon, the Supreme Court unanimously and unceremoniously
buried Betts v. Brady, holding that state defendants accused of a felony
were entitled to the appointment of counsel for their defense. 57 The
Court relied heavily on its opinion in Powell and other precedent to con-
clude that the right to counsel was fundamental. 58 The Gideon Court,
53. Id. at 475 (Black,J, dissenting). Justice Black relied heavily upon Powell in
his dissent, stating that Powell demanded the reversal of Betts' conviction. Id. at
475-76.
54. 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
55. Id. at 336. Defendant would have been entitled to counsel underJohnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), had this been a federal case. Zerbst at 458. For a
discussion of Zerbst, see supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. Clearly, how-
ever, under Betts there would have been no unusual circumstances, and therefore,
no violation of the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments would have occurred. Betts,
316 U.S. at 473. For a discussion of Betts, see supra notes 41-53 and accompanying
text.
56. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337. Defendant appeared in court without counsel
and requested the court to appoint counsel for him. Id. The court informed peti-
tioner that only defendants in capital cases were entitled to counsel in Florida. Id.
Petitioner went on to conduct his defense pro se, making an opening statement to
the jury, presenting and cross-examining witnesses and declining to testify person-
ally. Id. Thejury found petitioner guilty and he was sentenced to five years in state
prison. Id. After the Florida Supreme Court denied his petition for habeas corpus
relief, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 337-38.
57. Id. The Court, per Justice Black, completely refuted Betts, stating that it
"made an abrupt break with its own well considered precedents," and that Betts was
"an anachronism when handed down." Id. at 344-45. Justice Black's vindication of
his dissent in Betts was perceived as perhaps being too vigorous. See id. at 349
(Harlan, J., concurring) ("I agree that Betts v. Brady should be overruled, but con-
sider it entitled to a more respectful burial than has been accorded, at least on the
part of those of us who were not on the court when that case was decided."); see
also DANIELJ. MEADOR, PRELUDES TO GIDEON 283 (1967) (" [Justice] Black's opinion
has been criticized for the approach it took... [and its] tenor. . . appears to have
been the reason for the separate concurring opinions by Justices Clark and
Harlan.").
58. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341-45. The Court relied on Powell's broad language
and downplayed the narrow holding that Betts attributed to it. Id. at 341-42. It
emphasized that the Powell Court had "unequivocally declared that 'the right to
the aid of counsel is of... fundamental character.' " Id. at 342-43 (quoting Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932)). For a discussion of Powel4 see supra notes 22-
33 and accompanying text.
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therefore, through the Due Process Clause, extended the right to counsel
to defendants in state courts.59 Justices Douglas, Harlan and Clark con-
curred in the opinion,60 one of the most popular ever handed down by
the Supreme Court.
6 1
Nine years later, in Argersinger v. Hamlin,62 the Court extended the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel to include any indigent state defendant
who suffered a loss of liberty.63 In Argersinger, the defendant, an indigent
The Court also relied on Powell Zerbst and other cases that preceded Bets to
show that the right to counsel was fundamental even when Betts was handed down.
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-44 (citing Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941); Avery v.
Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 233-
34 (1936)). The Court, as it had in Zerbst, failed to provide any original intent
analysis. Id. at 336-45. For a discussion of Zerbst, see supra notes 34-39 and accom-
panying text.
59. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345. The Court subsequently determined that Gideon
was also fully retroactive. See, e.g., Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847, 847 (1971) (per
curiam).
60. Id. at 345-52 (Douglas, Clark and Harlan, JJ., concurring). Justice Doug-
las wished to express his thoughts on the history of the interrelation between the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 345-47 (Douglas, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Clark wrote separately to downplay Justice Black's suggestion that precedent
required either the Betts or Gideon Courts to hold that the appointment of counsel
was required. Id. at 347 (Clark, J., concurring). Rather, Justice Clark concurred
because he felt that the Gideon decision merely "erase[d] a distinction which has
no basis in logic and an increasingly eroded basis in authority." Id. at 348 (Clark,
J., concurring) (referring to distinction between Zerbst and Betts).
Justice Harlan clearly did not subscribe to Justice Black's characterization of
Betts. Id. at 349-50 (HarlanJ., concurring). Instead, Justice Harlan supported the
reversal of Bets because Bets' unusual circumstances requirement is often found
with the slightest excuse and "[t]o continue a rule which is honored by this Court
only with lip service is not a healthy thing and in the long run will do a disservice to
the federal system." Id. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring).
61. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The Gideon Case 25 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
1988, at A27 (noting that Gideon is "one of the most popular decisions ever handed
down by the United States Supreme Court"). Further bolstering the Court's hold-
ing were the amici curiae briefs of 22 of the states supporting its decision. Gideon,
372 U.S. at 336.
62. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
63. Id. at 40. Although Gideon was broadly written, the Supreme Court's deci-
sions after Gideon but before Argersinger suggested that the Court at the very least
failed to resolve the issue of whether the right to appointed counsel extended to
misdemeanor cases. See Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 481 (1972) ("In [Gideon] the
Court unanimously announced a clear and simple constitutional rule: In the ab-
sence of waiver, a felony conviction is invalid if it was obtained in a court that de-
nied the defendant the help of a lawyer." (emphasis added)); Mempa v. Rhay, 389
U.S. 128, 134 (1967) ("There was no occasion in Gideon to enumerate the various
stages in a criminal proceeding at which counsel was required, but ... clearly...
th [e] appointment of counsel for an indigent is required at every stage of a crimi-
nal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected.");
Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967) (noting that Gideon made it "unconstitu-
tional to try a person for a felony in a state court unless he had a lawyer or had
validly waived one." (emphasis added)); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 29 (1967)
("[Gault] would be entitled to clear advice that he could be represented by coun-
sel, and at least, if a felony were involved, the State would be required to provide
counsel if his parents were unable to afford it." (emphasis added)). Justice
1995] NOTE
11
Northup: Nichols v. United States: Using Prior, Uncounseled Misdemeanor Co
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
charged with a misdemeanor, was tried and convicted without benefit of
counsel and sentenced to six months imprisonment.64 The Court empha-
sized the importance of counsel for defendants to receive a fair trial,65 and
the illogic of distinguishing between misdemeanor and felony defend-
ants. 6 6 The Court therefore reversed the lower court and extended the
Harlan's concurrence also noted that the facts of Gideon did not extend to the
question of whether an indigent misdemeanor defendant was entitled to counsel.
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 44-
45 n.1 (PowellJ., concurring).
There was also some difficulty in determining whether a crime was a felony or
misdemeanor for purposes of determining whether the defendant was entitled to
counsel. Soon after Gideon was decided, the Supreme Court, in Patterson v. War-
den, 372 U.S. 776 (1963), vacated the uncounseled misdemeanor conviction of a
defendant and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Gideon. Patterson,
372 U.S. at 776. The convictions in Patterson, however, imposed a sentence of two
years and would therefore constitute a felony under federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 1
(1976). One interpretation of Patterson, therefore, may be that "Gideon applies in
cases in which the accused is charged with an offense that provides a felony-length
sentence, regardless of whether it is classified as a misdemeanor in the particular
jurisdiction." David S. Rudstein, The Collateral Use of Uncounseled Misdemeanor Con-
victions After Scott and Baldasar, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 517, 523 n.26 (1982).
64. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 26. Defendant was charged with carrying a con-
cealed weapon. Id. The trial judge sentenced him to 90 days in jail, though the
statute allowed imprisonment of up to six months, a $1,000 fine, or both. Id. De-
fendant appealed and his conviction was narrowly affirmed by the Florida
Supreme Court. Id. at 26-27; see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla.
1970) (4-3 decision) (providing further factual background), rev'd, 407 U.S. 25
(1972).
65. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 31-40. Powell and Gideon were both predicated on
the view that counsel is "often a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial." Id. at
31. Further, the Court reasoned that the rationale of Powell and Gideon extended
to any trial where a defendant may be deprived of his liberty. Id. at 32. The Court
found no support for the contention that a petty-offense prosecution will be less
legally complex and that counsel is not needed for a fair trial. Id. at 33.
66. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 27-31. There are three general classifications of
crimes: petty offenses, serious misdemeanors and felonies. BLACK'S LAw DICrION-
ARY 1146 (6th ed. 1990). Petty offenses, or petty misdemeanors, are those crimes
with a possible sentence of six months or less. Id. Serious misdemeanors are those
crimes with a potential sentence of greater than six months to one year. Id. Felo-
nies consist of "any offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term ex-
ceeding one year." Id. at 617; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1988); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 1.04(2).
The Court, per Justice Douglas, first noted that the Sixth Amendment does
not differentiate between felony and misdemeanor crimes, but rather, "provides
specified standards for 'all criminal prosecutions.' " Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 27
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI). Along this vein, the Court noted that it had not
distinguished between felonies, serious misdemeanors and petty misdemeanors in
the Sixth Amendment's protections regarding the right to public trial, to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation, the confrontation clause, or
compulsory process. Id.; see also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967)
(extending right of defendant "to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses" to state trials); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965) (extending
confrontation clause to states); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (holding that
right to "public trial" applied to state proceeding even though sentence was for
only 60 days).
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right to counsel to certain misdemeanor defendants. 6
7
The Court also noted with approval that:
It is simply not arguable, nor has any court ever held, that the trial of
a petty offense may be held in secret, or without notice to the accused of
the charges, or that in such cases the defendant has no right to confront
his accusers or to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf.
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 28 (quoting Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor
Cases, 32 WASH. L. REv. 685,705 (1968)).
One possible method of determining whether the right to counsel attached
was to use the same standard used in determining whether the Sixth Amendment
right to jury attached. The Court had recently held that the Sixth Amendment
right to jury attaches only in serious misdemeanor crimes. See Argersinger, 407 U.S.
at 29-31; see also Duncan v. Lousiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that right to
trial by jury applies to imprisonment of six months or greater). The Court ex-
plained that Duncan was hardly controlling because the Sixth Amendment right to
jury had "a different genealogy and is brigaded with a system of trial to a judge
alone." Id. at 29. The Court determined that linking the attachment to the right
to counsel to the attachment of the right to jury simply because both rights ap-
peared in the same amendment was inappropriate. Id. at 29-31.
The Supreme Court also noted another concern that led to the need for
counsel in misdemeanor cases. The vast number of misdemeanor cases could "cre-
ate an obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the result."
Id. at 34. This obsession could easily lead to prejudice. Id. at 36. The Court
quoted a report concluding that " '[m]isdemeanants represented by attorneys are
five times as likely to emerge from police court with all charges dismissed as are
defendants who face similar charges without counsel.' " Id. (quoting AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, LEGAL COUNSEL FOR MISDEMEANANTS, PRELIMINARY REPORT
1 (1970)).
67. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40. Specifically, the narrowest holding that could
be read from Argersinger is that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person
may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or
felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." Id. at 37.
Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall and Blackmun joined Justice Doug-
las' majority opinion. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 25. Justice Brennan's concurrence,
joined by Justices Douglas and Stewart, merely remarked that although Argersinger
had increased the burden on the resources of the legal community, innovative
programs like law student clinical programs could "make a significant contribu-
tion" to reducing that burden. Id. at 45 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Burger also wrote a separate concurrence, emphasizing the in-
creased burden placed on the legal community. Id. at 41-42 (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring). He stated, however, that the Court's decision should not surprise the legal
profession and that he had confidence in the ability of the profession to "ris[e] to
the burden[ ] placed on it." Id. at 43-44 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
Justice Powell's lengthy concurrence, joined by Justice Rehnquist, sought a
more flexible approach than that adopted by the majority in Argersinger. Id. at 47
(Powell, J., concurring). He disagreed with the majority's "rigid[ I" rule that a
defendant may not be imprisoned without the benefit of counsel. Id. (Powell, J.,
concurring). Justice Powell would instead "hold that the right to counsel in petty-
offense cases is not absolute but is one to be determined by the trial courts exercis-
ing a judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 63 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Powell initially agreed with the majority that the Supreme Court of
Florida incorrectly held that misdemeanor defendants, even those charged with
petty misdemeanors, are not entitled to the benefit of counsel. Id. at 47 (Powell,J.,
concurring). According to Justice Powell, many petty offenses present issues of
such complexity that a fair trial may not result when the defendant lacks the bene-
fit of counsel. Id. at 47-48 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell believed that the
appointment of counsel in only serious misdemeanors, or where the defendant is
13
Northup: Nichols v. United States: Using Prior, Uncounseled Misdemeanor Co
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Seven years after Argersinger, however, in Scott v. Illinois,68 a sharply-
divided Court decided which misdemeanor defendants Argersinger encom-
passed.6 9 The uncounseled defendant in Scott had been fined after a con-
viction for theft.70 The statute under which Scott had been convicted,
however, permitted a jail sentence of up to one year.7 1 The Court was
split over whether the standard should be that of "actual imprisonment"
or "authorized imprisonment. ' 72 The Court held that a defendant's un-
counseled conviction was valid even where imprisonment of up to one
year was authorized, as long as no term of imprisonment was actually im-
posed. 78 The dissent believed, however, that the spirit of Gideon and
incarcerated ignores the fact that "[d]ue process ... embodies principles of fair-
ness rather than immutable line drawing." Id. at 49 (Powell, J., concurring). Seri-
ous consequences may result from a penalty, though it does not involve
incarceration. Id. at 47-48 (Powell,J., concurring). The majority's rule, according
to Justice Powell, fails to take into account concepts of fairness critical to Four-
teenth Amendment analysis. Id. at 52 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell's
concurrence also expressed a concern for the increased burden on the lower
courts. Id. at 58-62 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Powell concluded that the majority decision, because it did not take
into account concepts of fairness, was too drastic. Id. at 63 (Powell,J., concurring).
According to Justice Powell, the right to counsel for misdemeanants should be
extended on a case-by-case basis. Id. (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell per-
haps best summarized his opinion by stating that "[i] t is my view that relying uponjudicial discretion to assure fair trial of petty offenses not only comports with the
Constitution but will minimize problems which otherwise could affect adversely
the administration of criminal justice in the very courts which already are under
the most severe strain." Id. at 66 n.34 (Powell, J., concurring).
68. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
69. Id. at 373 (5-4 decision) ("Although the intentions of the Argersinger Court
are not unmistakably clear .... we conclude today that ... actual imprisonment is a
penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment.., and
warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional
right to appointment of counsel."). As the majority in Scott recognized, the major-
ity opinion in Argersinger did not consider whether its rule applied in the context of
a defendant who had served no sentence "for here petitioner was in fact sentenced
to jail." Id. at 370 (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972)).
70. Scott, 440 U.S. at 368. Scott was fined $50 for shoplifting merchandise
valued at under $150. Id. His bench trial conviction was affirmed on appeal by the
Illinois intermediate appellate court and the Supreme Court of Illinois. Id. These
convictions were obtained over his objection that he was entitled to counsel under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Id.
71. Id. The penalty provision of the statute under which Scott was convicted
provided in pertinent part:
A person first convicted of theft of property not from the person and not
exceeding $150 in value shall be fined not to exceed $500 or imprisoned
in a penal institution other than the penitentiary not to exceed one year,
or both. A person convicted of such theft a second or subsequent time,
or after a prior conviction of any type of theft, shall be imprisoned in the
penitentiary from one to five years.
Id. at n.2 (quoting ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-1 (1969)).
72. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373, 375.
73. Id. at 373-74. The Court began its analysis by stating that it was unlikely
that the Sixth Amendment contemplated the appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants. Id. at 370. The Court then reviewed the history of the Sixth Amend-
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Argersinger compelled a finding that Scott was entitled to counsel.74
ment right to counsel decisions. Id. at 370-72. First, the Court noted that the
Framers never "contemplated any guarantee other than the right of an accused in
a criminal prosecution in a federal court to employ a lawyer to assist in his de-
fense." Id. at 370 (citing BFANEY, supra note 2, at 27-30). The Court went on to
state that decisions starting with Powell and continuing up to Argersinger, have "de-
parted from the literal meaning of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 370-72. The
Court proceeded to dissect Argersinger and characterized it as holding that only
imprisoned defendants are entitled to counsel. Id. at 373. Argersinger, therefore,
mandated a finding that Scott's conviction was valid. Id. at 373-74. The Court
stated that Argersingeis holding was justified "because of the Court's conclusion
that incarceration was so severe a sanction that it should not be imposed as a result
of a criminal trial unless an indigent defendant had been offered appointed coun-
sel to assist in his defense." Id. at 372-73. Otherwise, Scott reasoned that the socie-
tal cost of appointing counsel for every defendant who may lose his liberty would
be too high. Id. Further, "the central premise of Argersinger-that actual imprison-
ment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprison-
ment-is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the
line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel." Id. at 373.
Justice Powell again wrote a separate concurrence, though he joined the opin-
ion of the Court. Id. at 374-75 (Powell, J., concurring). He stated that he believed
Argersinge~s holding was not "required by the Constitution." Id. at 374 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Further, he had "continuing reservations about the Argersinger rule."
Id. Considerations of stare decisis and the need for "clear guidance" to trial courts,
however, compelled him to join the Court's opinion. Id. at 374-75 (Powell,J., con-
curring). He hoped, however, that a majority of the Court would eventually adopt
a more flexible rule. Id. at 375 (Powell,J., concurring). He may have had in mind
the more flexible rule he promulgated in Argersinger. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 44-
67 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). For a discussion of Justice Powell's concur-
rence in Argersinger, see supra note 67.
74. Scott, 440 U.S. at 375-76 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan,joined
by Justices Marshall and Stevens, vigorously argued against the majority's charac-
terization of Gideon and Argersinger. Id. at 377-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting). They
argued that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should extend to" 'all criminal
prosecutions.' " Id. at 375 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend.
VI).
The theme of this dissenting opinion revolved around the "clear and sound"
principles of Gideon and Argersinger which the majority "chooses to ignore." Id. at
376 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissent noted that "implicit and
explicit" in Argersinger was the understanding that the right to counsel existed in
trials involving serious misdemeanors. Id. at 380-82 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
also Steven Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 Am.
CRIM. L. REv. 601, 609 (1975) (stating that Argersinger established "two-dimen-
sional" test for right to counsel where either incarceration is likely or offense is
non-petty misdemeanor).
Justice Brennan then argued that the correct standard for determining
whether to appoint counsel should be in all cases where there is "authorized im-
prisonment," rather than the majority's adoption of an "actual imprisonment"
standard. Scott, 440 U.S. at 382 (Brennan,J., dissenting). First, the dissent argued,
"the 'authorized imprisonment' standard more faithfully implements the princi-
ples of the Sixth Amendment identified in Gideon." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Second, "authorized imprisonment" is a test that presents fewer administrative
problems. Id. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissent referred
with approval to many of the problems enunciated injustice Powell's concurrence
in Argersinger. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 52-55
(Powell, J., concurring) (providing detailed prediction of difficulties majority deci-
sion would create). Justice Brennan also characterized the majority's "concern for
1995] NOTE 489
15
Northup: Nichols v. United States: Using Prior, Uncounseled Misdemeanor Co
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
The next year, in Baldasar v. Illinois,75 the Court was presented with
the question of whether a prior, uncounseled, misdemeanor conviction
could be used to increase the sentence of a defendant found guilty in a
subsequent proceeding.76 When the defendant in Baldasar was convicted
the economic burden that an 'authorized imprisonment' standard" would impose
as "both irrelevant and speculative." Scott, 440 U.S. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). Further, the defendant would be entitled to counsel in at least 33 of the
current states because those states "appear to be governed only by the 'likelihood
of imprisonment' standard." Id. at 388 & n.22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan's dissent continued by criticizing the majority for providing
defendants with less rights under the right to counsel "than the admittedly less
fundamental right to jury trial." Id. at 389 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citingJustice
Powell's concurrence in Argersinger). This dissenting opinion also managed to pre-
dict the confusion over the collateral consequences allowable under Scott. Id. at
382 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see, e.g., GARCIA, supra note 1, at 13 ("Despite
Baldasar's mitigating effect, the opinion fails to remove the bulk of the pernicious
effects fostered by Scott."). This confusion led to the Court's plurality opinion the
following term in Baldasar and fourteen years of diverging lower court views until
the Nichols decision was handed down. For a discussion of the Baldasar holding
and the confusion it created, see infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
Justice Blackmun, in a separate dissent, stated his view that the right to coun-
sel was invoked when defendants were either prosecuted for a non-petty offense or
convicted and incarcerated. Scott, 440 U.S. at 389-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Consequently, he argued not that the right to counsel should attach where there is
authorized imprisonment (as the other dissenters did), but rather that the right to
counsel should attach where either: (1) the offense is non-petty, or (2) actual
imprisonment is imposed. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For further criticism of
the majority's holding in Scott as inconsistent with prior precedent, see GARCIA,
supra note 1, at 12-14; Lawrence Herman & Charles A. Thompson, Scott v. Illinois
and the Right to Counsel: A Decision in Search of a Doctrine?, 17 AM. CriM. L. REv. 71,
91-94 (1979); Alan Rubin, Note, Scott v. Illinois: The Right to Counsel Retreats, 41 U.
Prr. L. REv. 647, 655-61 (1980); Stephan A. Watring, Note, Criminal Procedure: The
Outer Limits of the Indigent's Right to Appointed Counsel, 5 U. DAYTON L. REv. 177, 185-
86 (1980).
75. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam).
76. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 222. Under Scott, the uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction was valid as long as no sentence of imprisonment was imposed. Scott,
440 U.S. at 373-74 (stating "that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment" without benefit of counsel). The question in Baldasar,
therefore, was whether the conviction, valid under Scott because no sentence had
been imposed, could be collaterally used to increase a sentence. Baldasar, 446 U.S.
at 222; see also GARcIA, supra note 1, at 13 (explaining Baldasar as "proscribing the
use of an uncounseled conviction for the purpose of sentence enhancement").
There is, however, some dispute over what question was presented in Baldasar.
Some lower courts, in attempting to interpret Baldasar, limited the holding to the
exact facts of the case, which involved increasing a misdemeanor to a felony due to
a prior uncounseled conviction. See, e.g., Wilson v. Estelle, 625 F.2d 1158, 1159 n.1
(5th Cir. Unit A 1980) (stating that Baldasar only held that "a prior uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction may not [be] used under an enhanced penalty statute to
convert a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony with a prison term"), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 912 (1981). But see United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 854 (holding
"that an 'uncounseled misdemeanor conviction [may] not be used collaterally to
impose an increased term of imprisonment upon a subsequent conviction' ")
(quoting Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
Further, the per curiam opinion in Baldasar itself states that the question is
whether "a conviction [valid under Scott] may be used under an enhanced penalty
490 [Vol. 40: p. 475
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of a misdemeanor for the second time, a state recidivist statute turned the
second misdemeanor into a felony despite the fact that his first conviction
was uncounseled. 77 The Court, by the narrowest of margins, held that
such use of a prior conviction was unconstitutional under the Sixth
Amendment. 78 A vigorous dissent, however, garnered more votes than
statute to convert a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony with a prison term."
Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 222. Because, however, Nichols presumed the broadest hold-
ing of Baldasar and reversed it, the distinction is not particularly important. Nich-
ols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1924 (1994).
77. Baldasar, 446 US. at 223. The defendant, Thomas Baldasar, was convicted
of misdemeanor theft in May of 1975. Id. Proceeding without benefit of counsel,
he was convicted, fined $159 and sentenced to a year of probation. Id. (citing ILL.
REv. STAT., ch. 38, §§ 16-1(e)(1), 1005-8-3(a) (1), 1005-9-1(a)(2) (1975)). In No-
vember of that year, he was charged with the theft of a $29 shower head. Id. Pur-
suant to an Illinois recidivist statute, the prosecution charged him with a felony.
Id. (citing ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(b) (5) (1975)). Defense counsel un-
successfully objected to the use of the prior, uncounseled conviction. Id. Baldasar
was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for one to three years. Id. The
Illinois Appellate Court affirmed and the Supreme Court of Illinois denied leave
to appeal. Id. at 223-24.
78. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 224 (5-4 decision) (per curiam). The per curiam
opinion, after reviewing the facts, did not provide a detailed rationale but rather
merely referred the reader to the three concurrences. Id. Justice Stewart, joined
by Justices Brennan and Stevens, wrote a three-sentence concurrence. Id. at 224.
Justice Stewart, despite his lack of explanation, provided the swing vote from the
Scott decision. It was his vote, joined with those of the dissenters in Scott that gave
the Baldasar majority the minimum number of votes needed to reverse the lower
court. See id.; Scott, 440 U.S. at 367.
Justice Stewart's concurrence simply stated that because defendant "was sen-
tenced to an increased term of imprisonment only because he had been convicted
in a previous prosecution in which he had not had the assistance of appointed
counsel in his defense ... [i]t seems clear to me that this prison sentence violated
the constitutional rule of Scott." Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 224 (StewartJ., concurring).
Justice Stewart also noted that Illinois, prosecuting here as in Scott, expressly antici-
pated the result in this case in its brief in Scott.
When prosecuting an offense the prosecutor knows that by not request-
ing that counsel be appointed for defendant, he will be precluded from en-
hancing subsequent offenses. To the degree that the charging of offenses
involves a great deal of prosecutorial discretion and selection, the deci-
sion to pursue conviction with only limited use comes within proper
scope of that discretion.
Id. at 224-25 n.* (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for Respondent at 20,
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (No. 77-1177)).
Justice Marshall, also joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, wrote the
broadest of the three concurring opinions. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 224-29 (Marshall,
J., concurring). Justice Marshall reasoned that the basis of Argersinger was that an
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction was too unreliable to allow imprisonment.
Id. at 227-28 (Marshall, J., concurring). Due to this unreliability, an uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction is "not valid for all purposes." Id. at 226 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). Further, to allow "a rule that held a conviction invalid for imposing a
prison term directly, but valid for imposing a prison term collaterally, would be an
illogical and unworkable deviation from our previous cases." Id. at 228-29 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun, writing a separate concurrence, provided the critical fifth
vote. Id. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun limited his con-
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any one of the three concurrences that constituted the majority. 79
Baldasar, however, did not give clear guidance to the lower courts. 80
Rather, the per curiam opinion merely referred to the reasoning in
the three concurring opinions, none of which commanded the votes of
more than three Justices.81 The Court in Baldasar splintered in such a way
that both the states8 2  and the federal circuit courts of
currence to reaffirming his dissenting view in Scott. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Had the Scott Court adopted his approach, he stated that "the present litigation, in
all probability, would not have reached us." Id. at 230 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Because Baldasar was prosecuted for a serious misdemeanor and was entitled to
counsel under Justice Blackmun's test in his Scott dissent, Justice Blackmun there-
fore concurred with the majority. Id. (Blackmun,J., concurring). For a discussion
of Justice Blackmun's dissent in Scott, see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
79. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 230-35 (Powell,J., dissenting). Justice Powell, joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist, dissented. Id. Justice
Powell found "logically indefensible" the majority's finding that a conviction, valid
under Scott, was invalid for collateral purposes. Id. at 231 (Powell, J., concurring).
He further expressed concern that the lower courts "no longer have clear gui-
dance from this Court." Id. For a discussion of the confusion created by Baldasar,
see infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
Justice Powell asserted that just as constitutionally invalid convictions were in-
valid for all purposes, so should constitutionally valid convictions be valid for all
purposes. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 232-33 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Loper v.
Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 483 (1972) (holding that uncounseled felony conviction, inva-
lid under Gideon, could not be used to impeach defendant); United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448-49 (1972) (holding that prior uncounseled felony con-
viction, invalid under Gideon, could not be used by sentencing judge); Burgett v.
Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967) (holding that uncounseled felony conviction, inva-
lid under Gideon, could not enhance punishment under recidivist statute). For a
general discussion of collateral uses of invalid convictions, see Paul D. Leake, Note,
Limits to the Collateral Use of Invalid Prior Convictions to Enhance Punishment for a Subse-
quent Offense: Extending Burgett v. Texas and United States v. Tucker, 19 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REv. 123 (1987).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 407 (6th Cir. 1992) (stat-
ing that "[gliven the diverse rationales supporting Baldasar's result, numerous
courts have questioned whether the case expresses any single holding and, accord-
ingly, have largely limited Baldasar to its facts"); see also Lily Fu, Note, High Crimesfrom Misdemeanors: The Collateral Use of Prior, Uncounseled Misdemeanors Under the
Sixth Amendment, Baldasar and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 77 MINN. L. REv. 165,
167 (1992) (stating that "no discernible rule emerges" from Baldasar and calling
on Supreme Court to "clarify the nebulous state of the law").
81. For a discussion of the various concurring opinions and the dissenting
opinion in Baldasar, see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Bilbrey v. State, 531 So. 2d 27, 32 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (holding
that Baldasar prohibits using prior uncounseled convictions to enhance subse-
quent sentence); Pananen v. State, 711 P.2d 528, 532 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (con-
struing Baldasar to hold "that an uncounseled conviction is simply too unreliable
to be depended on for purposes of imposing a sentence of incarceration, whether
that sentence is imposed directly or collaterally"); Lovell v. State, 678 S.W.2d 318,
320 (Ark. 1984) (citing Baldasar and stating that it is impermissible to use prior
conviction to enhance sentence unless misdemeanant was represented by counsel
or waived counsel); Krewson v. State, 552 A.2d 840, 841 (Del. 1988) (same); State
v. Beach, 592 So. 2d 237, 239 (Fla. 1992) (reaffirming adoption of Blackmun's
concurrence as holding of Baldasar); State v. Vares, 801 P.2d 555, 557 (Haw. 1990)
(stating that "[a]n uncounseled conviction cannot be used collaterally to support
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an enhanced sentence where such enhanced sentence includes a term of impris-
onment"); People v. Finley, 568 N.E.2d 412, 414 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (explaining
that "[t] he rationale underlying the Baldasar decision is that an uncounseled con-
viction is not sufficiently reliable to support a sentence of imprisonment"); State v.
Cooper, 343 N.W.2d 485, 486 (Iowa 1984) (disallowing use of prior, uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction to enhance sentence of incarceration); State v. Priest, 722
P.2d 576, 579 (Kan. 1986) (same), overruled by State v. Delacruz, 899 P.2d 1042
(Kan. 1995); State v. Wiggins, 399 So. 2d 206, 207 (La. 1981) (stating that Baldasar
precluded use of prior, uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance subse-
quent sentence); State v. Dowd, 478 A.2d 671, 678 (Me. 1984) (same); People v.
Olah, 298 N.W.2d 422 (Mich. 1980) (stating that Baldasar held that "[a] court may
not enhance punishment at sentencing because of a misdemeanor or ordinance
conviction obtained when defendant was not represented by counsel"), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 957 (1981); People v. Martinez, 485 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that sentencing court may not consider prior uncounseled convic-
tions in subsequent sentencing); State v. Fussy, 467 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Minn. 1991)
(reaffirming Minnesota Supreme Court holding in State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d
901, 905 (Minn. 1983), which disallowed use of prior, uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction); State v. Welty, 729 S.W.2d 594, 601 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that
prior uncounseled conviction cannot be used to enhance sentence in subsequent
proceeding where incarceration is to be imposed unless counsel is waived); State v.
Reimers, 496 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Neb. 1993) (allowing use of prior, uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction only where defendant had benefit of counsel or where
knowing, intelligent waiver affirmatively appears on record); State v. Smith, 329
N.W.2d 564, 566 (Neb. 1983) (rejecting pre-Baldasar Nebraska precedent and
adoptingJustice Marshall's concurrence in Baldasar that prior, uncounseled misde-
meanor conviction could not be used to enhance subsequent sentence); State v.
Laurice, 575 A.2d 1340, 1347 (N.J.) (same), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 (1990); State
v. Ulibarri, 632 P.2d 746, 748 (N.M. Ct. App.) (recognizing that Baldasar and
Argersinger stand for proposition that "an uncounseled prior conviction, felony or
misdemeanor, may not be used to enhance a subsequent offense"), cert. denied, 632
P.2d 1181 (N.M. 1981); People v. Butler, 468 N.Y.S.2d 274 (App. Div. 1983) (re-
quiring record showing of knowing, intelligent waiver in order to use prior, un-
counseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance subsequent penalty); State v.
Black, 277 S.E.2d 584, 585 (N.C. Ct. App.) (disallowing collateral increase of
sentences based upon prior, uncounseled, misdemeanor conviction), cert. denied,
281 S.E.2d 395 (N.C. 1991); State v. Lober, No. 92-CA-29, 1993 WL 81923, at *3
(Ohio Ct. App. March 23, 1993) (same); Bromley v. State, 757 P.2d 382, 386 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1988) (holding that Justice Marshall's opinion is holding of Baldasar
and prohibiting use of prior, uncounseled misdemeanor convictions to enhance
subsequent penalty); City of Pendleton v. Standerfer, 688 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. 1984)
(stating that Baldasas most "straight-forward" holding is that "[ijf the initial un-
counseled misdemeanor conviction cannot be used directly to impose a prison
term, then it cannot be used indirectly either to elevate a subsequent charge from
a misdemeanor to a felony or to impose an increased term of imprisonment"); In
re Kean, 520 A.2d 1271, 1277-78 (R.I. 1987) (stating that Baldasar disallowed use of
prior, uncounseled misdemeanor convictions to enhance subsequent sentence but
placing burden on defendant to show lack of waiver of counsel in prior proceed-
ing); State v. O'Brien, 666 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) (adopting
Supreme Court of New Mexico's holding in State v. Ulibarri, 632 P.2d 746, 748
(N.M. 1981) and concluding that subsequent use of prior, uncounseled misde-
meanor conviction is barred by Baldasar); State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 147 n.3
(Utah 1989) (stating that Baldasar bars use of prior, uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction to enhance subsequent sentence); Sargent v. Commonwealth, 360
S.E.2d 895, 902 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (same); State v. Armstrong, 332 S.E.2d 837,
841 (W. Va. 1985) (stating that both Sixth Amendment and state constitution for-
bid use of prior uncounseled conviction to enhance current sentence), overruled by
19
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appeals8 3 could not agree on the exact holding of Baldasar.84 With the
State v. Hopkins, 453 S.E.2d 317, 324 (W. Va. 1994) (relying in part on Nichols and
holding that prior, uncounseled misdemeanor conviction can be used to enhance
sentence); State v. Novak, 318 N.W.2d 364, 368-69 (Wis. 1982) (allowing use of
prior, uncounseled conviction where prior proceeding merely involved civil forfei-
ture proceeding); Laramie v. Cowden, 777 P.2d 1089, 1090 (Wyo. 1989) (requiring
either showing of representation or affirmative waiver of counsel in order to use
prior uncounseled conviction in enhancing subsequent sentence); see also State v.
Keyes, No. 950048, 1995 WL 510359, at *2 (N.D. Aug. 29, 1995) (holding that State
v. Orr, 375 N.W. 171, 176 (N.D. 1985), held that as matter of state constitutional
law, prior uncounseled conviction cannot be used to enhance sentence). But see
Moore v. State, 352 S.E.2d 821, 822 (Ga. Ct. App.) (restricting Baldasar to its facts
and holding that use of prior, uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance
subsequent sentence is constitutional), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 904 (1987); Berry v.
State, 561 N.E.2d 832, 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (limiting Baldasar to its facts and
holding that subsequent penalty may be enhanced by prior, uncounseled convic-
tion); State v. Grogan, 385 N.W.2d 254, 255 (Iowa 1987) (allowing use of prior,
uncounseled convictions in repeat offender statute to be used to revoke driver's
license); Sheffield v. City of Pass Christian, 556 So. 2d 1052, 1053 (Miss. 1990)
(restricting Baldasar to facts and allowing collateral use to enhance sentence);
State v. Grondin, 563 A.2d 435, 439-40 (N.H. 1989) (same); Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 507 A.2d 57 (Pa. 1986) (allowing use of prior, uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction to enhance sentence of defendant believing Justice Blackmun and four
dissenters in Baldasar would have held his prior conviction valid for such use);
State v. Chance, 405 S.E.2d 375 (S.C. 1991) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1120
(1992); State v. Hickok, 695 P.2d 136, 140 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (stating in dicta
that Baldasar merely stood for proposition that prior, uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction cannot result in elevation of subsequent offense from misdemeanor to
felony).
83. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1926-27. Given the diverse holdings and reason-
ings involved, it is difficult to categorize the split in circuits into two groups. It is
clear, however, that some of the circuits construed the Baldasar opinion narrowly,
while others considered it to be more far reaching. The former group of circuits
limited Baldasar to its facts and held that a prior, uncounseled, misdemeanor con-
viction should be allowed to increase a subsequent penalty as long as it did not
specifically involve elevating a misdemeanor to a felony. See United States v.
Thomas, 20 F.3d 817, 823 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (holding that Baldasar only pre-
vents incarceration where it would otherwise not be imposed but does not apply to
strictly sentence-enhancing circumstances), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 98 (1994);
United States v. Falesbork, 5 F.3d 715, 718 (4th Cir. 1993) (restricting Baldasar
decision only to prevent elevation of misdemeanor to felony and holding that use
of prior conviction to enhance subsequent sentence is constitutional); United
States v. Follin, 979 F.2d 369, 376 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding Baldasar to be of little
guidance and concluding that prior uncounseled misdemeanor offenses valid for
all purposes), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3004 (1993); United States v. Castro-Vega, 945
F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Peagler, 847 F.2d 756, 758
(11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (allowing sentencing court to consider uncounseled
convictions); Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1983)
(stating that Baldasar "decision provides little guidance outside of the precise fac-
tual context in which it arose"), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984). Some circuits,
however, have held that Baldasar should be read as prohibiting prior, uncounseled
misdemeanor convictions from enhancing a subsequent penalty, or allowing only
very limited use of the prior conviction. See United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844,
854 (9th Cir. 1991) (using Justice Marshall's broad concurrence as basis for hold-
ing that prior uncounseled convictions may not be used to enhance subsequent
sentence); cf. Santillanes v. United States Parole Comm'n, 754 F.2d 887 (10th Cir.
1985) (allowing use of uncounseled conviction where use depends on fact that
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state and federal courts in disarray as to the answer to this important ques-
tion of Constitutional and criminal law, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Nichols v. United States.85 The Nichols Court intended
to resolve the confusion caused by Baldasar and to provide clear guidance
to the lower courts.86
III. NzcHOLs V. UNvD-E STA TES
A. Facts
In September of 1990, defendant Kenneth Nichols and his co-conspir-
ator Robert Harkins attempted to purchase cocaine from federal agents. 8 7
Harkins contacted the agents and agreed to pay $65,000 for three kilo-
grams of cocaine. 88 Harkins and Nichols were arrested when they at-
conviction exists rather than reliability of conviction); Charles v. Foltz, 741 F.2d
834, 837 (6th Cir. 1984) (allowing use of uncounseled misdemeanor convictions
only for impeachment purposes), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985).
84. See Fu, supra note 80, at 166 n.13 (recognizing that "conflicting views of
the effect of Baldasar on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines has resulted in a split
of opinion between circuits"). The Supreme Court also provided little guidance
during the period between Baldasar and Nichols. See Thomas, 20 F.3d at 822 n.3
(noting that Supreme Court's "most revealing restatement of Baldasarms rule is en-
closed within parentheses within a citation within a footnote," which stated that a
"court may not constitutionally use prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction
collaterally to enhance a subsequent misdemeanor to a felony with an enhanced
term of imprisonment" (referring to Court's cite to United States v. Mendoza-Lo-
pez, 481 U.S. 841 n.18 (1987))).
85. United States v. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
86. Id. Justice White had previously argued that the Court should grant certi-
orari in order to resolve the confusion over Baldasa,?s holding. See Moore v. Geor-
gia, 484 U.S. 904, 905 (1987) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White stated that he
would grant certiorari to determine Baldasat's "scope and proper application" be-
cause "the confusion over Baldasar's holding has led to uneven application of that
case and conflicting decisions in the courts below." Id.
Justice White's concerns clearly animated the Court's grant of certiorari in
Nichols. Id. at 1925. In Nichols, the Court stated that "[w] e granted certiorari ... to
address this important question of Sixth Amendment law, and to thereby resolve a
conflict among state courts as well as Federal Courts of Appeals." Id. For a discus-
sion concerning the confusion in the lower courts after Baldasar, see supra notes
82-83 and accompanying text.
87. United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 405 (6th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 114 S.
Ct. 1921 (1994). This was the second time Nichols and Harkins had attempted to
make a drug purchase from federal agents. Id. The first attempt occurred in
March of 1990 when, through a third party, federal agents contacted Nichols and
Harkins and offered to sell them cocaine in large quantities. Id. at 404. Nichols
and Harkins agreed to purchase five kilograms at $20,000 per kilogram. Id. Nich-
ols sent Harkins to meet with the agents and instructed him to bring one kilogram
back for testing without paying for it. Id. at 404-05. If the cocaine was found to be
satisfactory, Harkins planned to meet with the agents and make full payment on
the cocaine. Id. at 405. Harkins met with the agents in a Tennessee motel room,
but the agents refused to allow Harkins to leave with an unpaid kilogram of co-
caine. Id. Harkins telephoned Nichols and was instructed to call off the deal,
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tempted to make their purchase and soon thereafter, Harkins decided to
cooperate with the authorities.8 9
A grand jury handed down a three-count indictment against Nichols,
who subsequently plead guilty to count one, possession with intent to dis-
tribute cocaine. 90 Three months later, a pre-sentence report set a sentenc-
ing guideline range of 188 to 235 months. 9 1 The sentencing court held
hearings to consider Nichols' objections to the report.92 The objections
included the pre-sentence report's use of an uncounseled drunk-driving
conviction, a misdemeanor Nichols had received in 1983. 93 After the sec-
89. Id. Nichols, in an attempt to protect himself, sent Harkins to meet the
federal agents and conduct the transaction. Id. Nichols and Harkins were una-
ware, however, that surveillance officers had observed their meeting prior to the
transaction. Id. Approximately 15 minutes after Harkins' attempt to conduct the
transaction was halted by his arrest, Nichols was also arrested. Id. The officers
found Nichols emerging from a wooded area and walking towards his truck. Id. A
subsequent search of the woods uncovered $40,000 hidden in a tree stump. Id.
Harkins' cooperation and subsequent testimony served to incriminate Nichols
even further. Id. at 413.
90. Id. at 405 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988) (amended 1990) and 21 U.S.C.
§ 846 (1988)). Both Nichols and Harkins were charged with the same three
counts. Id. Count two charged them with attempt to possess with the further at-
tempt to distribute, also in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988) (amended 1990)
and 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988). Id. Count three charged them with violating 18
U.S.C. § 1952(a) (1988) (amended 1990), by facilitating a drug trafficking offense
by traveling in interstate commerce. Id.
91. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1424. The report included an assessment of four
criminal history points. Id. Three resulted from a 1983 felony drug conviction,
while the fourth resulted from a 1983 misdemeanor conviction for driving under
the influence. Id. With respect to the misdemeanor conviction, Nichols could
have potentially been punished with up to one year of imprisonment and fined
$1,000. Id. at 1424 n.1 (citing GA. CODF ANN. § 40.6-391(c) (1982)). He was, how-
ever, only fined $250 and not incarcerated. Id. at 1424. His conviction was there-
fore valid under Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), because he was not "actually"
incarcerated. Scott, 440 U.S. at 374. For a discussion of the Scott decision, see supra
notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
The fourth criminal history point (the misdemeanor conviction) increased
Nichols' Criminal History Category from Category II to Category III under the
Sentencing Guidelines, resulting in an increase from a possible 168-210 month
sentence for Category II to a possible 188-235 month sentence under Category III.
Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1424 (citing U.S.S.G., supra note 10, ch. 4, pt. A). For a discus-
sion of the Sentencing Guidelines, see supra note 10.
92. Nichols, 979 F.2d at 405. In addition to the Baldasar claim, Nichols con-
tested the sentencing court's consideration of suppressed evidence in connection
with a prior narcotics charge for which no conviction had been obtained. United
States v. Nichols, 763 F. Supp. 277, 280-81 (E.D. Tenn. 1991), aff'd, 979 F.2d 402
(6th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
93. Nichols, 763 F. Supp. at 278. Nichols offered two objections to the use of
the prior uncounseled conviction. First, he argued that the pre-sentence report
improperly applied a version of the Sentencing Guidelines that had been
amended after his offense. Id. at 278-79. The November 1, 1990 amendment to
the Sentencing Guidelines stated that "[p] rior sentences, not otherwise excluded,
are to be counted in the criminal history score, including uncounseled misde-
meanor sentences where imprisonment was not imposed." Id. at 278 (quoting
U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 4A1.2 cmt.). The Commission included the following
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ond hearing, the sentencing court concluded that it would consider the
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in calculating Nichols' criminal-his-
tory score. 94
The court then sentenced Nichols to 235 months imprisonment, the
maximum sentence within the Guidelines given Nichols' status.95 Nichols
appealed the sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, attacking, inter alia, the use of his prior, uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction.96  A divided panel affirmed his con-
explanatory language: "[tihe Commission does not believe the inclusion of
sentences resulting from constitutionally valid, uncounseled misdemeanor convic-
tions in the criminal history score is foreclosed by Baldasar." Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at
1927 n.11 (quoting 55 Fed. Reg. 5741 (1990)).
The November 1, 1990 amendment replaced the language of the 1989 Sen-
tencing Guidelines that read "if to count an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction
would result in the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment under circumstances
that would violate the United States Constitution, then such conviction shall not be
counted in the criminal history score." Nichols, 763 F. Supp. at 278-79 (quoting
UNrED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES, Guidelines Manual, § 4A1.2, cmt., n.6 (Nov.
1989)). This language, Nichols argued, which was in effect when he committed his
offense, was the proper language to use for determining his criminal history score.
Id. Further, this language clearly precluded the use of his prior, uncounseled mis-
demeanor conviction in determining his offense level. Id.
Nichols' second claim was based on Baldasar. Nichols, 979 F.2d at 406. Nichols
argued that the Sentencing Guidelines, if read to allow the use of his prior convic-
tion, promulgated a system in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. Id. Under
Baldasar, Nichols argued, his uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be
used to increase his sentence and therefore the pre-sentence report was incorrect.
Id.
94. Nichols, 979 F.2d at 405. The sentencing court rejected Nichols' threshold
objection that the pre-sentence report had applied the wrong version of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines. Id. at 405-06. The district court determined that this objec-
tion could not be sustained because it was "clear that the Sentencing Guidelines
have, even prior to November 1, 1990, permitted the counting of uncounseled
misdemeanor convictions toward a defendant's criminal history score, although
perhaps not very clearly." Nichols, 763 F. Supp. at 279.
The district court then rejected Nichols' Baldasar claim. Id. The court
adopted the view taken by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in United States v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1990). Id. In Eckford, the Fifth
Circuit interpreted Baldasar to stand "only for the proposition that a prior uncoun-
seled misdemeanor conviction may not be used to create a felony with a prison
term." Id. (citing Eckford, 910 F.2d at 220). The district court, therefore, found
that Nichols' prior, uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could be used to en-
hance his sentence. Id.
95. Id. at 281. The district court remained within the Sentencing Guidelines
despite the prosecution's request that the court depart upwards from the guideline
range. Id. at 280-81. The prosecution sought this departure because it felt that
even the maximum guideline range of 235 months did not adequately reflect the
seriousness of defendant's criminal behavior. Id. at 280. The Court, however, felt
that 235 months did not "significantly underrepresent" the defendant's past crimi-
nal history. Id. at 281; see also U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 4A1.3 (explaining grounds
for district courts to depart from Sentencing Guidelines).
96. United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d at 405. In addition to his Baldasar
claim, Nichols also appealed on four other grounds. First, Nichols argued that the
sentencing court's consideration of the suppressed evidence of his 1988 arrest on
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drug charges was a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
408-09. The Sixth Circuit upheld Nichols' first argument in principle, indicating
in dicta that illegally seized evidence should not normally be used by a sentencing
court in determining a defendant's sentence. Id. at 409-12. On the specific facts
presented in the case before it, however, the court held that the purpose sought
from excluding evidence, to deter police misconduct, would not be properly
served by withholding evidence, which was illegally seized in a separate and unre-
lated incident, from the sentencing court's decision. Id. at 411-12.
Second, Nichols cited as error the sentencing court's decision to increase his
offense by two levels for firearm possession under § 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines.
Id. at 412-13. Nichols contended that his co-conspirator's possession of a firearm
was not reasonably foreseeable, and therefore, Nichols was exempt from having
the possession attributed to him under the Guidelines. Id.; see U.S.S.G., supra note
10, § 2D1.1 (b) (1). The Sixth Circuit rejected Nichols' unforeseeability arguments,
citing Harkins' undisputed testimony that he had asked Nichols whether he should
carry a weapon, that the evidence indicated Nichols had previously purchased
weapons from Harkins and that the firearms were linked to their drug trafficking
activities. Nichols, 979 F.2d at 412. The sentencing court increased Nichols' of-
fense by two levels based on these facts and because § 2D1.1(b) (i) of the Guide-
lines does not require actual knowledge. Id. at 412-13.
Next, Nichols argued that the sentencing court's use of a prior, uncompleted
drug transaction to set his base offense level was erroneous. Id. at 413. This claim
arose out of the first attempted drug transaction with federal agents, which Nichols
aborted when he was not allowed to test the drugs he was purchasing. Id. Because
that particular transaction involved a greater quantity of drugs than was actually
purchased in the subsequent transaction, the sentencing court allowed that quan-
tity to be used in determining the base offense level pursuant to § 1B1.3(a) of the
Guidelines. Nichols, 979 F.2d at 413. That section allows the base level to be deter-
mined by "all such acts and omissions that were part of the same course of conduct
or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction." Id. (citing U.S.S.G.,
supra note 10, § 1B1.3(a)(2)). Further, the sentencing court relied on § 2D1.4 of
the Guidelines, which provides:
If the defendant is convicted of an offense involving negotiation to traffic
in a controlled substance, the weight under negotiation in an uncom-
pleted distribution shall be used to calculate the applicable amount.
However, where the court finds that the defendant did not intend to pro-
duce and was not reasonably capable of producing the negotiated
amount, the court shall exclude from the guideline calculation the
amount that it finds the defendant did not intend to produce and was not
reasonably capable of producing.
Id. (quoting U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 2D1.4, cmt. n.1). Specifically, Nichols ar-
gued that the prior, uncompleted transaction, having occurred three months
before the successful transaction, could not be "part of the same course of conduct
or common scheme or plan." Nichols, 979 F.2d at 413. Nichols further argued that
the prior deal should not be counted because he decided not to complete the
deal. Id. at 414.
The Sixth Circuit rejected both arguments, stating that precedent allowed a
great deal of flexibility in determining whether a particular factual circumstance
was included in the same scheme or plan. Id. at 413-14. In addition, the Sixth
Circuit noted that the Sentencing Guidelines clearly intended the inclusion of an
earlier transaction unless " 'the defendant did not intend to produce and was not
reasonably capable of producing the negotiated amount.' " Id. at 414 (quoting
U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 2D1.4, cmt., n.1).
Finally, Nichols argued that the sentencing court mistakenly failed to grant
him a two-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to § 3E1.1 of
the Guidelines. Id. The Sixth Circuit recognized that the issue of acceptance of
responsibility was a factual determination left to the district court's discretion. Id.
24
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viction.9 7 Nichols then appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari.
98
B. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court revisited its holding in Baldasarand
once again examined the question of whether a prior, uncounseled misde-
meanor conviction could be used to enhance the sentence of a subsequent
conviction.9 9 ChiefJustice Rehnquist, who authored the majority opinion
in Nichols, began his analysis with a brief overview of relevant Supreme
Court precedent.' 0 0 The Court then reviewed the concurring and dissent-
The court determined that the lower court had not acted clearly erroneously in
refusing to grant Nichols a two-level adjustment because of his denial "despite per-
suasive evidence to the contrary" of his involvement in the attempted purchase of
five kilograms of cocaine in March of 1990. Id.
97. Id. The Sixth Circuit was only divided with respect to the Baldasar ques-
tion. Id. at 415. Judge Jones, writing for the majority on the other four issues,
disagreed with his colleagues and would have remanded for sentencing pursuant
to a holding that Baldasar barred the use of a prior, uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction to enhance the penalty in a subsequent conviction. Id. at 405-08.
On appeal, Nichols presented the same two-pronged attack to the use of his
prior, uncounseled conviction that was used at sentencing. Id. at 406. Judge Jones
agreed with his colleagues and the sentencing court that the Sentencing Guide-
lines in effect before 1990 requires the use of his prior, uncounseled conviction
"unless so doing would violate the Constitution." Id. at 406. JudgeJones did, how-
ever, accept Nichols' argument that Baldasar barred the use of the prior convic-
tion. Id. at 406-08. Judge Jones, relying solely on Baldasar, believed "that even a
narrow reading" of that case required a finding that the use of a prior, uncoun-
seled misdemeanor conviction to increase a prison sentence for a subsequent con-
viction was unconstitutional. Id. at 407-08.
Judge Nelson, writing for the majority solely with respect to the Baldasar issue,
disagreed with Judge Jones' analysis. Id. at 414-18. Judge Nelson, joined by Judge
Lively, relied upon the findings of a majority of the circuit courts and believed that
in the wake of confusion following Baldasar, the only recourse for the court was to
limit Baldasar to its facts. Id. at 415-18.
Surprisingly, neither Judge Jones nor Judge Nelson addressed the court's
dicta in Wang v. Withworth, 811 F.2d 952 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1051
(1987), where a different Sixth Circuit bench construed Baldasar quite broadly and
seemed to acceptJustice Marshall's concurring opinion as controlling. Wang, 811
F.2d at 955. The holding in Wang seems clear in light of the unequivocable lan-
guage used when the Sixth Circuit stated that "Baldasar prohibits the use of that
uncounseled conviction to 'be used collaterally to impose an increased term of
imprisonment.'" Id. (quoting Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring), overruled by Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994)).
Further, "[i]t does not matter that Wang's prior misdemeanor conviction did not
result in imprisonment. Baldasar clearly prevents the use of that uncounseled con-
viction to subject Wang to the possibility of increased imprisonment at a subse-
quent trial." Id. at 956.
98. Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 39 (1994). The Court limited the
grant of certiorari to the question of whether a prior, uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction could be used to enhance the sentence of a subsequent conviction. Id.
at 1925 & nn.8-9.
99. Id. at 1924-25.
100. Id. at 1925-26. ChiefJustice Rehnquist was joined by Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. Id. at 1923. Justice Souter filed an opinion concur-
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ing opinions in Baldasar.1° 1
The Court attempted to determine what constitutional rule could be
derived from Baldasar.102 The Court found, as many lower courts had,
that normal methods of determining the holding of a per curiam opinion
were unhelpful in interpreting Baldasar.103 The Court also noted that the
confusion Baldasar engendered among the lower courts further supported
its conclusion that Baldasar needed re-examination. 10 4
After repeating its "continued adherence" to its holding in Scott v.
Illinois,10 5 the Court provided its rationale for overturning Baldasar and
allowing the use of an uncounseled, misdemeanor conviction to increase a
ring only in the judgment. Id. at 1923, 1929. Justice Blackmunjoined by Justices
Ginsburg and Stevens, filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1923, 1931. Justice Gins-
burg also filed a separate dissenting opinion. 1d. at 1923, 1937.
The Court started by analyzing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). Id. at
1923. The Court stated that Scott had been "dictated" by the Court's decision in
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Id. at 1925. Even if that was not the
case, the majority repeated its belief that the line drawn in Argersinger, requiring
actual imprisonment, was " 'eminently sound.' " Id. (quoting Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367, 373 (1979)). For a further discussion of the Scott decision, see supra
notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
101. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1926-27. For a discussion of the opinions in
Baldasar, see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
102. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1926-27.
103. Id. at 1926-27. Generally, the Supreme Court analyzes per curiam opin-
ions such as Baldasar under the methodology set out in Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188 (1977). The Marks Court stated that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides
a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Jus-
tices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.' " Id. at 193
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). See generally Mark A.
Thurmon, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme Court
Plurality Decisions, 42 DuKE L.J. 419 (1972) (providing criticism of and alternative
to Marks' position).
The Nichols Court also cited to the divergent holdings of circuit courts to sup-
port the proposition that no discernable rationale can be derived from Baldasar.
Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 192-27; see, e.g., United States v. Castro-Vega, 945 F.2d 496,
499-500 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that no "lowest common denominator" can be de-
rived from Baldasar); United States v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216, 219 (5th Cir. 1990)
(finding that inconsistencies in opinions "has clouded the scope of the Baldasar
decision"); United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1989) (implying
that Justice Marshall's Baldasar concurrence is holding of that case), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1037 (1990); Santillanes v. United States Parole Comm'n, 754 F.2d 887,
889 (10th Cir. 1985) (determining thatJustice Blackmun's concurrence is holding
of Baldasar). For a discussion of the split among the state and federal courts over
the proper interpretation of Baldasar, see supra notes 82-83 and accompanying
text.
104. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927. Specifically, the Court stated that "[t]his de-
gree of confusion following a splintered decision such as Baldasar is itself a reason
for re-examining that decision." Id. (citations omitted).
105. Id. at 1927. The Court noted that five members of the Baldasar Court-
the four dissenters and Justice Stewart, continued to adhere to the Court's deci-
sion in Scott. Id.
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sentence in a subsequent proceeding.1 0 6 The Court explained that re-
peat-offender laws "penaliz[e] only the last offense committed by the de-
fendant."1 0 7 The opinion also emphasized that the sentencing process is
"less exacting" than the process to determine guilt.10 8 The Court then
rejected the petitioner's argument that due process requires a warning to
a misdemeanor defendant that his uncounseled conviction may be used to
enhance the penalty for a subsequent conviction.' 0 9 Finally, the Court,
without comment, rejected Nichols' argument that Scott be overruled." 0
106. Id. at 1927-28. The Court expressly overturned Baldasar and held that
"consistent with the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, that
an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no prison term
was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent con-
viction." Id. at 1928.
107. Id. at 1927 (quoting Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 232 (1979) (Pow-
ell,J., dissenting), overuled by Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994)); see
also Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962) (noting "constitutionality of the prac-
tice of inflicting severer criminal penalties upon habitual offenders"); Moore v.
Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 677 (1895) (explaining justification of increased severity
for repeat offenders).
In Baldasar, Justice Marshall accepted the statement "that the increased [sub-
sequent] prison sentence.., is not an enlargement of the sentence for the origi-
nal offense." Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 227 (Marshall, J., concurring). He rejected the
notion, however, that the collateral use of a prior, uncounseled conviction was
valid to enhance a subsequent penalty. Id. If the sentence punished the first con-
viction and not the second, Justice Marshall cogently noted, that "this would be a
double jeopardy case." Id.
108. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927. The Court proceeded to note that sentencing
judges have historically been able to consider a" 'wide variety of factors in addition
to evidence of guilt in determining what sentence to impose on a convicted de-
fendant.'" Id. at 1928 (quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2199
(1993)). Recidivism is one of the most important factors that ajudge may consider
when sentencing a defendant, as evidenced by the inclusion of recidivism into the
Sentencing Guidelines and many state recidivist statutes. Id. In addition, the
Court noted that consideration of previous conduct that did not result in a convic-
tion is also a constitutionally valid factor in the determination of a sentence. Id.;
see also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (noting that sentencing
judge must have "fullest information possible concerning defendant's life" in or-
der to select appropriate sentence).
109. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928. The Court first stated that Scott did not sug-
gest any warning requirement. Id. A warning would be problematic because it
would not be clear exactly how expansive the warning would have to be. Id. The
Court also noted that many misdemeanor convictions occur in courts that are not
courts of record. Id. The inability to memorialize these warnings "[w]ithout a
drastic change in the procedures of these courts," justified a rejection of defend-
ant's due process claim. Id. Further, such a warning "would merely tell him what
he must surely already know." Id.
110. Id. at 1928. Nichols' brief in support of overruling Scott stated that
[t]his position is consistent with the position taken by the American Bar
Association on August 8, 1990, in the Standards for Criminal Justice Pro-
viding Defense Services, Third Edition which provides as follows: Stan-
dard 5-5.1 Criminal Cases Counsel should be provided in all proceedings
for offenses punishable by death or incarceration, regardless of their de-
nomination as felonies, misdemeanors, or otherwise.
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C. Justice Souter's Concurring Opinion
Justice Souter wrote a concurring opinion in Nichols, concurring only
in the Court's result."1 ' Primarily, he disagreed with the broadness of the
majority holding.112 Rather than overrule Baldasar, Justice Souter be-
lieved that the Court could find Nichols' sentence constitutional simply
because the Sentencing Guidelines did not mandate a higher sentence for
someone in Nichols' position. 13 He argued instead that the ability of the
sentencing court to depart from the Guidelines allowed the Court to de-
cide the case on other grounds.' 14 Justice Souter then stated that because
he believed the issue was not presented in Nichols, he would leave unan-
swered the question of whether the Sixth Amendment allowed a scheme
in which a prior, uncounseled misdemeanor automatically increased a sen-
Brief for Petitioner at 37, United States v. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994) (No. 92-
8556). The Court failed to comment on this argument but explicitly reaffirmed its
holding in Scott. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928.
111. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1929 (Souter,J., concurring).
112. Id. at 1929, 1931 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter specifically
stated, "I write separately because... I wish to be clear about the narrow ground
on which I think this case is properly decided." Id. at 1929 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
113. Id. at 1929-30 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter began by expres-
sing his belief that Baldasar had no "holding that can be overruled." Id. at 1929
(Souter, J., concurring). He read Baldasar as splitting the Court, four votes to four,
over whether a conviction valid under Scott could be used to enhance a subsequent
sentence. Id. (SouterJ., concurring). The potential tie-breaking vote, that ofJus-
tice Blackmun, "refused to accept the premise upon which the other Justices pro-
ceeded" and resolved the matter on separate grounds. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
The equally-divided Court, therefore, was "entitled to no precedential value." Id.
(Souter, J., concurring). For a discussion of the opinions in Baldasar, see supra
notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
Justice Souter distinguishes Baldasar by noting that "unlike the sentence-en-
hancement scheme involved in Baldasar, the Sentencing Guidelines do not provide
for automatic enhancement based on prior uncounseled convictions." Nichols, 114
S. Ct. at 1930 (Souter,J., concurring). Although the Sentencing Guidelines auto-
matically include prior uncounseled convictions in the criminal history score, they
are nonetheless constitutional because "they also expressly empower the district
court to depart from the range of sentences prescribed for a criminal-history cate-
gory that inaccurately captures the defendant's actual history of criminal conduct."
Id.; see U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 4A1.3. Because the role of the Sentencing Guide-
lines is "presumptive, not conclusive," a sentencing court may take into account
the unreliability of the prior conviction and thereby resolve the potential constitu-
tional infirmity. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1930 (Souter,J., concurring).
114. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1930 (Souter, J., concurring). Specifically, Justice
Souter stated that "[b]ecause the Guidelines allow a defendant to rebut the nega-
tive implication to which a prior uncounseled conviction gives rise, they do not
ignore the risk of unreliability associated with such a conviction." Id. (Souter, J.,
concurring). Further, "[w]here concern for reliability is accommodated, as it is
under the Sentencing Guidelines, nothing in the Sixth Amendment or our cases
requires a sentencing court to ignore the fact of a valid uncounseled conviction,
even if that conviction is a less confident indicator of guilt than a counseled one
would be." Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
[Vol. 40: p. 475
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tence in a subsequent conviction.1 15
D. Justice Blackmun's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Blackmun's dissent, although agreeing with some of the un-
derlying bases for the majority's holding, vigorously disagreed with the
conclusions the majority drew. 1 6 He argued that (1) deriving a discerni-
ble holding from Baldasar was not as difficult as the majority con-
tended;1 17 (2) the majority's holding in Nichols was not consistent with
Scott,1 18 and (3) the slim distinction upon which Justice Souter's concur-
rence is based had no real world applicability.1 9 Justice Blackmun also
relied upon both the language and spirit of the Supreme Court's decisions
in Gideon and Argersinger to determine that a defendant may not be incar-
cerated for any length of time, either directly or collaterally, for an un-
counseled conviction.
120
First, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the majority's characterization
of Baldasar, stating that the holding of Baldasar is clear and should be fol-
115. Id. at 1931 (Souter,J., concurring). After stating that he agreed that the
Sentencing Guidelines' use of a prior conviction is constitutional, Justice Souter
stated that "[t]hat is enough to answer the constitutional question this case
presents." Id. (Souter, J., concurring). He expressly withheld his opinion on the
broad constitutional question the majority viewed Nichols as presenting, stating that
he was "shy, however, of endorsing language in the Court's opinion that may be
taken as addressing the constitutional validity of a sentencing scheme that auto-
matically requires enhancement for prior uncounseled convictions, a scheme not
now before us." Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
Justice Souter, therefore, like Justice Blackmun in Baldasar, concurred in the
result but on fundamentally different grounds from the rest of the majority. It is
important to note, however, that Justice Souter's vote was the sixth for the major-
ity. Because there was a majority opinion that garnered five votes in NicholsJustice
Souter's concurrence will not play a pivotal role in creating confusion among the
lower courts as did Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Baldasar. See id. at 1923.
For a discussion of the important role ofJustice Blackmun's concurring opinion in
Baldasar, see supra note 78.
116. Id. at 1933 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (stating that "although it is undeni-
able that recidivist statutes do not impose a second punishment," it is undeniable
that defendant's sentence was directly increased by prior, uncounseled misde-
meanor conviction). Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Stevens and Gins-
burg. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117. See id. at 1932 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the dis-
sent's view of the majority's analysis of Baldasar, see infra note 121-23 and accompa-
nying text.
118. Id. at 1933-34 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the dis-
sent's characterization of Scott, see infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
119. Id. at 1935 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun refers to
Justice Souter's concurrence only in a lengthy footnote. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) . For a discussion ofJustice Blackmun's response to justice Souter's argument,
see infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
120. Id. at 1931-32, 1935-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority opinion
does not mention Gideon and mentions Argersinger only in the context of explain-
ing Scott. Id. 1924-28. For a discussion of Gideon, see supra notes 54-61 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of Argersinger, see supra notes 62-67 and
accompanying text.
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lowed in Nichols.121 The dissent proceeded to analyze Scott, reading Scott as
holding that uncounseled misdemeanor convictions are too unreliable to
incarcerate a defendant. 122 Therefore, he argued that the inherent unre-
liability of an uncounseled conviction which served as the basis of the Scott
decision is also insufficiently reliable to increase a sentence for a subse-
quent conviction.1 23
The dissent also stated that it failed to understand how the majority
concluded that the process of sentencing is "less exacting" than that of
obtaining a conviction 'justif[ies] greater punishment."124 Moreover, the
rule that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction cannot serve as the ba-
121. Id. at 1932 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun readily disposes
of any argument that Baldasar has no discernible holding. Id. (Blackmun. J., dis-
senting). He quotes or defines the holdings of the three concurring opinions in
Baldasar and in a lengthy footnote attempts to clarify his opinion in that case. Id.
at 1932 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
In a parenthetical, he describes his opinion in Baldasar as "adhering to dis-
senting position in Scott that an uncounseled conviction is invalid not only where
the defendant is sentenced to any actual incarceration but also where the defend-
ant is convicted of an offense punishable by more than six months in prison." Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Further, Justice Blackmun stated:
[A]lthough I based my decision on my belief that the uncounseled con-
viction was invalid in the first instance because Baldasar was charged with
an offense punishable by more than six months in prison, I expressed no
disagreement, and indeed had none, with the premise that an uncoun-
seled conviction that was valid under Scott was invalid for purposes of im-
posing increased incarceration for a subsequent offense.
Id. n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
It should be noted, however, thatJustice Blackmun failed to join eitherJustice
Marshall's or Justice Stewart's concurrence in Baldasar. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446
U.S. 222, 224 (1980), overruled by Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
For a discussion of the reasoning contained in the concurring opinions in
Baldasar, see supra note 78. For a discussion of the confusion Baldasar engen-
dered, see supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
122. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1932-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Black-
mun focused primarily on the uncounseled conviction's reliability, rather than it's
validity under Scott. Id. at 1933, 1935-36. The dissent summed up Scott as "con-
firm [ing] that any deprivation of liberty, no matter how brief, triggers the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
123. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This inherent unreliability of prior,
uncounseled convictions that may or may not lead to incarceration is what the
dissent argued was one reason that the use of the conviction was unconstitutional
in Baldasar. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Blackmun noted
that "the animating concern in the Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has
been to ensure that no indigent is deprived of his liberty as a result of a proceeding
in which he lacked the guiding hand of counsel." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1934 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun argued that
although sentencing may be a "less exacting" process than determining guilt, this
does not mean that an uncounseled conviction is reliable enough to enhance the
length of a sentence. Id. at 1933-34. Justice Blackmun also disputed whether the
cases cited by the majority supporting the notion that judges traditionally have had
a great deal of discretion in sentencing is particularly relevant in determining this
narrow Sixth Amendment question. Id. at 1933 n.2 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (cit-
ing majority's use of Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993); McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)). The
504
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sis of incarceration "is faithful to the principle born of Gideon and
announced in Argersinger that an uncounseled misdemeanor.., is not reli-
able enough to form the basis for the severe sanction of incarceration., 125
The dissent also disagreed with the reasoning behind Justice Souter's
concurrence. 126 In a lengthy footnote, the dissent strongly disagreed with
Justice Souter's belief that the Sentencing Guidelines' structure, in al-
lowing a defendant to convince the sentencing court that a downward de-
parture is warranted, passes Sixth Amendment muster.127 Justice
Blackmun forcefully argued that it is unrealistic to expect a defendant to
successfully dispute a prior conviction and obtain a downward departure
from the Sentencing Guidelines.1 28 The dissent quoted ChiefJustice Bur-
ger's concurrence in Argersinger, where he stated that an "[a]ppeal from a
conviction after an uncounseled trial is not likely to be of much help to a
defendant since the die is usually cast when judgment is entered on an
uncounseled trial record."1 29 In addition, such convictions will now bene-
fit from the same presumption of validity as other convictions. 130 There-
fore, the dissent found "the district court's authority to depart downward
too tenuous a check on the use of unreliable misdemeanor convictions to
salvage a sentencing scheme that is, in my view, a violation of Scott."13 1
dissent argued that "[t]he cases provide scant, if any, support for the majority's
rule... [n]one even addresses the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel." Id.
Furthermore, the majority cites to a case in which the Court ruled that a sen-
tencing court may consider conduct, but the dissent easily distinguished considera-
tion of conduct from consideration of prior convictions. Id. at 1933-34
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The conduct case cited, McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477
U.S. 79 (1986), allowed the defendant to rebut the state's evidence and "put the
State to its proof, examining its witnesses, rebutting its evidence, and testing the
reliability of its allegations." Id. at 1934 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This ability of
the defendant to rebut the state's evidence on conduct is easily differentiated from
allowing the state to merely introduce practically irrebuttable evidence of a prior
conviction. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 1935 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Here, the dissent refers to the
broad language in both Gideon and Argersinger to advance its reliability argument.
See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that "[c]ontrary to the rule set forth by
the Court .... an uncounseled misdemeanor.., is not reliable enough to form the
basis for the severe sanction of incarceration"). Further, reliability concerns have
previously led the Court to hold that uncounseled felony convictions cannot be
subsequently used to increase a prison term under state recidivist statutes. Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); see Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967). Clearly,
the dissent argues that there is no logical ground upon which to distinguish Nichols
from these cases. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1935 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
126. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1935 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
127. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Justice Souter's con-
currence, see supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
128. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 41 (1972) (Burger, CJ.,
concurring)).
130. See, e.g., Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994) (restricting de-
fendant's right to attack prior conviction as unconstitutional when used to en-
hance sentence).
131. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1935 n.4 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
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Finally, Justice Blackmun argued that the rule the dissent promotes
"that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction can never be used to in-
crease a prison term," was "eminently logical," and workable.13 2 Its logic,
the dissent notes, is grounded in Justice Marshall's concurrence in
Baldasar.13 3 There, Justice Marshall argued that "[a]n uncounseled con-
viction does not become more reliable merely because the accused has
been validly convicted of a subsequent [offense]." 134 Moreover, Justice
Blackmun maintained that the rule is workable because it acts as a clear
guide to trial courts, attorneys and defendants that an uncounseled con-
viction may not serve as the basis for incarceration, either directly or col-
laterally. 135 Justice Ginsburg also wrote a separate dissent to indicate a
minor disagreement with part of Justice Blackmun's reasoning. 13 6
IV. ANALYSIs
In upholding the sentencing court's use of the prior conviction, the
Supreme Court reversed its holding in Baldasar and drifted away from the
spirit, if not the narrowest possible interpretation of its holdings in Gideon
and Argersinger.1 3 7 To support its conclusion that Baldasar must be over-
turned and the Nichols rule be put in its stead, the Nichols majority rested
primarily upon the need for a clear, workable rule and its decision in
Scott.1 3 8 Although the majority's opinion successfully sets forth a workable
132. Id. at 1936 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
133. Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
134. Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (quoting Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222,
227-28 (1980) (MarshallJ., concurring), overruled by Nichols v. United States, 114 S.
Ct. 1921 (1994)). For a full discussion of Justice Marshall's concurrence in
Baldasar, see supra note 78 and accompanying text.
135. Id. at 1936 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Although this rule may cause an
increase in appointed counsel, the burden upon the states that may result must be
"subordinated" to the Sixth Amendment. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
136. Justice Ginsburg, who joined injustice Blackmun's dissent, also wrote a
brief, separate dissent to disagree with Justice Blackmun's interpretation of a sup-
porting case. Id. at 1937 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg merely
wished to note that Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994), cited by justice
Blackmun as supporting the presumptive validity of a valid conviction, "presented
a forum question. The issue was where, not whether, the defendant could attack a
prior conviction for constitutional infirmity." Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She
therefore agreed with justice Blackmun's opinion in its entirety except for its reli-
ance on Custis. Id.
137. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928-31 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also, GARcIA,
supra note 1, at 12-13 (stating that Baldasar had helped mitigate damaging effects
of Scott, which was "paradoxical in light of its disapproval by the Argersinger major-
ity"); Rudstein, supra note 63, at 531 (stating that because "[i]n Argersinger and
Scott, the Court was concerned with the imprisonment of an uncounseled indigent
defendant convicted of a misdemeanor . . . [t]he additional period of imprison-
ment, therefore, must be the key to Baldasa").
138. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924-28 (stating that fractured decision of
Baldasar has resulted in conflict among lower courts and need for clear, concise
rule). For a discussion of the majority's analysis, see supra, notes 99-110 and ac-
companying text.
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rule, the dissent suggested a rule that was equally workable and more
closely comported to the standards and ideals set forth in Powell and
Gideon.
To its advantage, the Court's opinion in Nichols successfully resolves a
contentious area of law and hands down a clear, unequivocable and work-
able rule.13 9 Further, the logic that a conviction, valid under Scott, should
be valid for all purposes is persuasive.1 40 As Justice Blackmun stated in
dissent, however, the majority's "logic is not unassailable." 14 1
Foremost among the problems with the Court's opinion is its "scant"
Sixth Amendment analysis. After determining that no constitutional rule
can be derived from Baldasar's concurring opinions, the Court offered
only two paragraphs of Sixth Amendment analysis. 142 First, the Court re-
affirmed the undisputed notion that recidivist statutes "do not change the
penalty imposed for the earlier conviction." 143 Second, the Court empha-
sized that sentencing judges have a great deal of discretion in the sentenc-
ing process. 144 Yet, neither of these undisputed facts supports the Nichols
139. See Baldasar, 446 U.S. 222, 230-31 (1980) (Powell,J., dissenting) (noting
that lower courts are entitled to clear rule that majority's opinion fails to provide),
overruled by Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994). Compare United States
v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 407 (1992) (noting that Baldasar's holding is based on
reasoning from three separate concurrences, none of which had the support of
five justices, and questioning whether Baldasar has any one single holding), with
United States v. Martin, 30 F.3d 142 (10th Cir.) (unpublished opinion) (stating
that Nichols resolves confusion caused by splintered court in Baldasar), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 454 (1994). For a discussion of the dissent's alternative rule and its
alignment with precedent, see infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
140. See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 233-34 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that
"[] ogically, just as a constitutionally invalid felony judgment could not be used for
sentence enhancement . . . the valid misdemeanor conviction in this case should
be available to enhance petitioner's sentence"). But see id. at 228-29 (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (stating that "[tjo the contrary, a rule that held a conviction invalid
for imposing a prison term directly, but valid for imposing a prison term collater-
ally, would be an illogical and unworkable deviation from our previous cases").
141. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1933 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Additional support
for Justice Blackmun's statement is provided by the fact that the Court's percep-
tion differed 14 years earlier in Baldasar. See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 224. Further, the
split among the states and circuit courts evidences the numerous possible interpre-
tations of the Court's opinions in Argersinger, Scott and Baldasar. Nichols, 114 S. Ct.
at 1924-25. For a discussion of the split among the states and circuit courts in
interpreting Baldasar, see supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
142. Id. at 1926-28. For a discussion of the majority opinion in Nichols, see
supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
143. Id. at 1927. Neither the dissenters in Nichols nor even the broadest con-
currence in Baldasar disagreed with this claim. Id. at 1933 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) ("[I]t is undeniable that recidivist statutes do not impose a second
punishment for the first offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.");
Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 227 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("I agree that the increased
prison sentence in this case is not an enlargement of the sentence for the original
offense. If it were, this would be a double jeopardy case.").
144. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927-28. The dissent also agrees with this conten-
tion, stating that the less exacting sentencing process "may be true as a general
proposition." Id. at 1933 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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majority's conclusion.1 45 The majority's review of the dissenting opinion
in Baldasar, with which it agreed, is of little assistance, reducing Justice
Powell's powerful dissent to a single paragraph.' 46 This minimal Sixth
Amendment analysis by the Court undermines the persuasiveness of its
reasoning. 1
4 7
145. See id. at 1931-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 1927. The Court's summation of the dissent in Baldasar stated:
Justice Powell authored the dissent, in which the remaining three Mem-
bers of the Courtjoined. The dissent criticized the majority's holding as
one that "undermines the rationale of Scott and Argersinger and leaves no
coherent rationale in its place." The dissent opined that the majority's
result misapprehended the nature of enhancement statutes which "do
not alter or enlarge a prior sentence," ignored the significance of the
constitutional validity of the first conviction under Scott, and created a
"hybrid" conviction, good for the punishment actually imposed but not
available for sentence enhancement in a later prosecution. Finally-and
quite presciently-the dissent predicted that the Court's decision would
create confusion in the lower courts.
Id. at 1926 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the dissenting opinion in
Baldasar, see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
147. Cf id. at 1937 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (stating that majority overturns
Baldasar "[w]ith scant discussion of Sixth Amendment case law or principles").
The majority opinion also fails to note other potentially persuasive arguments. An
illustration is the failure of the Court to mention the argument that a majority of
the circuit courts of appeal have found that a misdemeanor conviction, valid under
Scott, could be used to enhance a subsequent sentence. The Second, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal, at least to some
degree, limited Baldasar and held that a prior, uncounseled misdemeanor convic-
tion could be considered in subsequent sentencing. See, e.g., United States v.
Thomas, 20 F.3d 817, 823 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding that Baldasar only
prevents incarceration where it would otherwise not be imposed and does not ap-
ply to strictly sentence-enhancing circumstances); United States v. Falesbork, 5
F.3d 715, 718 (4th Cir. 1993) (restricting Baldasar to elevation of misdemeanor to
felony and holding that use of prior conviction to enhance subsequent sentence is
constitutional); United States v. Follin, 979 F.2d 369, 375-76 (5th Cir. 1992) (re-
stricting Baldasar to its facts and allowing uncounseled conviction to enhance sub-
sequent sentence), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3004 (1993); United States v. Castro-Vega,
945 F.2d 496, 499-500 (2d Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Peagler, 847 F.2d
756, 758 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (allowing sentencing court reliance on
uncounseled convictions in collateral proceedings); Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit
Court, 715 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that "decision provides little gui-
dance outside of the precise factual context in which it arose"), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1068 (1984).
Only the Ninth Circuit read Baldasar broadly, applying the holding espoused
by Justice Marshall's concurrence and Justice Blackmun's dissent in Nichols. See
United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 854 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that prior un-
counseled convictions may not be used to enhance subsequent sentence). The
Tenth Circuit fell short of the Ninth Circuit's broad rule against the use of prior,
uncounseled convictions, but they still limited the Baldasar holding, allowing the
use of an uncounseled conviction only where the use depends on the fact of con-
viction, but not when it depends on the reliability of conviction. See Santillanes v.
United States Parole Comm'n, 754 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1985).
A simple jurisdictional count, therefore, clearly indicates that a majority of the
circuit courts had not only expressed dismay over the unclear holding in Baldasar,
but when faced with deciding the rule of law to apply, applied that of the dissent.
[Vol. 40: p. 475
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The persuasively written dissenting opinion also undermines the ma-
jority in Nichols.1 48 The dissent not only successfully undercuts the reason-
ing of the majority, but it also promulgates an equally clear and logical
rule.1 4 9 Furthermore, it adheres more faithfully to the principles of
Gideon and Argesinger.150 Most importantly, Justice Blackmun's dissent
best protects the rights guaranteed to all defendants under the Sixth
Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in Nichols will have a direct and substantial ef-
fect on numerous criminal cases.151 Nichols will have a direct impact on
any repeat offender who was previously convicted of a misdemeanor with-
out the benefit of counsel. After Nichols, these offenders are subject to
enhanced penalties based on their prior, uncounseled misdemeanor con-
victions. Although the Supreme Court's opinion settled an important area
of law that had been very unclear, it also set a disturbing precedent that
may lead to stiffer sentencing of defendants after prior convictions which
may not be constitutionally reliable.15 2
The Court did not suggest any possibility of re-examining Gideon or
Argersinger. Those seminal Sixth Amendment cases seem beyond the possi-
bility of attack, much less reversal. The Court in Nichols, however, fur-
The majority in Nichols, however, failed to mention this persuasive argument and
discussed those cases only in reference to the confusion Baldasar created. Nichols,
114 S. Ct. at 1926-27.
148. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1931-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1931-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion is very
broad in scope, carefully examining and undermining each of the majority's sup-
porting points. Id. at 1933-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In each instance, the
dissent attempts to thwart the thrust of the majority's attack on Baldasar. Id. Ac-
cording to Justice Blackmun, Baldasar had a clear holding, despite the failure of
any Justice to garner five votes. See id. at 1932 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The
majority in Nichols, the dissent contends, overrules that holding in clear defiance of
both logic and precedent. See id. at 1933-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a full
discussion of the dissenting opinion in Nichols, see supra notes 116-36 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of an alternative rule to those of both the majority
and dissent, see Note, Sixth Amendment Limits on Collateral Uses of Uncounseled Convic-
tions, 91 YALE LJ. 1000, 1008-13 (1982) (establishing three conditions as require-
ments before uncounseled conviction can be used in collateral proceedings).
150. See, e.g., Comment, "Strike Three, Yer Out!?". Examining the Constitutional
Limits on the Use of the Prior Uncounseled DWI Convictions to Impose Mandatory Prison
Sentences on Repeat DWI Offenders, 28 SAN DIEco L. REv. 685, 704-10 (1991) (arguing
that because "lawyers are essential to ensure fair trials with accurate and reliable
results . . . [uncounseled] convictions may not be used for 'incarceration'
purposes").
151. See, e.g., LAFAVE & ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 9 (1985) (estimating that
only 20% to 30% of all arrests are for felonies, with remaining 70% to 80% consti-
tuting misdemeanors).
152. Cf GARCIA, supra note 1, at 13; Note, Criminal Procedure: The Outer Limits
of the Indigent's Right to Counsel-Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), 5 U. DAYrON
L. REv. 177 (1980).
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thered Scott's success in undermining Argersinger.153
The problems with using a misdemeanor conviction to increase the
penalty of a subsequent conviction were well enunciated by the Court's
concurring justices in Baldasar and the dissent in Nichols.154 The Baldasar
Court's inability to form a coherent, unified precedent for the lower
courts does not reduce or diminish the logic of forbidding the collateral
use of a prior, uncounseled misdemeanor conviction.1 55 The Nichols
Court, meanwhile, failed to cogently enunciate the reasons for reversing
Baldasar, other than the fact that Baldasar failed to give clear guidance to
the lower courts.1
56
One method of reducing the detrimental effect of the Court's deci-
sion was suggested in the majority opinion itself. The Nichols Court explic-
itly stated that its ruling does not bar state courts from relying upon their
own state constitutions either to provide counsel for all misdemeanor de-
fendants or bar the use of a prior, uncounseled conviction to enhance the
penalty of a subsequent conviction. 157 Indeed, the Court pointed out that
many states have already done so.15 8 For instance, many states have al-
ready made the assistance of counsel a requirement in cases where the
Supreme Court has determined the United States Constitution does
not.1 59 It remains to be seen how many more states will adopt similar
153. Cf GARCIA, supra note 1, at 13 (stating that Scott's harmful effects were
somewhat mitigated by Baldasar); Herman & Thompson, supra note 74 (noting
that Scott answered negatively issue remaining after Argersinger about whether there
was right to counsel when there was no imprisonment); Rubin, supra note 74, at
647 (noting that prior precedent established right to counsel at all critical steps,
but Scott limited right to situations where criminal is imprisoned).
154. See Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 224-30 (1980) (Stewart, Marshall,
Blackmun, Brennan and Stevens, JJ., concurring), overruled by Nichols v. United
States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994); Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1933-37 (Blackmun,J., dissent-
ing). For a discussion of the concurring opinions in Baldasar, see supra note 78
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the dissent in Nichols, see supra notes
116-36 and accompanying text.
155. For a discussion of the various concurring opinions in Baldasar, see supra
note 78 and accompanying text.
156. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1925-27 (stating that "[t]his degree of confusion
following a splintered decision such as Baldasar is itself a reason for re-examining
that decision").
157. Id. at 1928 n.12. States are, of course, free to define liberty interests
more broadly than the Supreme Court under their own state constitutions. See,
e.g., Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) ("[A] state is free as a matter of its
own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds
to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards."); Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58, 62 (1967) ("Our holding, of course, does not affect the State's power to
impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the Federal
Constitution if it chooses to do so."). For a discussion of state protections against
the collateral use of an uncounseled, misdemeanor conviction, see infra notes 159-
60 and accompanying text.
158. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928 n.12 (noting that many "states guarantee the
right to counsel whenever imprisonment is authorized ... not imposed").
159. See, e.g., ALAsKA CONST. art. 1, § 11 ("to have assistance of counsel for his
defense") (interpreted as including misdemeanor defendants in Alexander v. City
[Vol. 40: p. 475
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statutory provisions in the aftermath of Nichols, or alternatively, how many
state courts will follow the Court's suggestion and breathe new life into
of Anchorage, 490 P.2d 910 (1971)); IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13 (providing counsel in
all criminal prosecutions); CAL. PENAL CODE § 987 (West 1995) (providing counsel
in all criminal cases); COLO. REV. STAT. § 21-1-103 (1990) (providing counsel in all
misdemeanors and all municipal code violations at discretion of public defender);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-296(a), 51-297(f) (West 1995) (same); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 29, § 4602 (1995) (providing counsel for all indigents under arrest or
charged with crime if defendant requests or court orders); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-
2, 4 (1990) (providing counsel for any violation of state law or local ordinance
which may result in incarceration); HAw. REv. STAT. § 802-1 (1994) (providing
counsel for any offense "punishable by confinement injail"); IDAHO CODE § 19-851
(1995) (requiring counsel be provided to retain incarceration as sentencing op-
tion); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27A, § 4 (1994) (requiring counsel where incarceration
may be imposed); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.02, 611.14 (1995) (providing counsel for
felonies and "gross misdemeanors" and where "petty" misdemeanors are those not
punishable by imprisonment or fine greater than $200); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-
15 (1993) (requiring counsel where defendant is charged with felony or misde-
meanor punishable by greater than 90 days imprisonment); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 95-1001 (1994) (allowing court to assign counsel where court desires to retain
sentencing option or if counsel is "in the interest of justice"); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 178.397 (1993) (providing counsel for persons accused of "gross misdemeanors"
or felonies); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A-2 (West 1994) (providing counsel for those
threatened with incarceration); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-15-12 (Michie 1994) (provid-
ing counsel for any offense carrying possible sentence of imprisonment); N.Y.
CRiM. PROC. LAw § 170.10(3) (McKinney 1993) (providing counsel for all misde-
meanors except traffic violations); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451(a) (1977) (providing
for counsel in any misdemeanor case in which imprisonment or fine of $500 or
more is likely to be imposed); OKL. STAT. tit. 22, § 251 (1995) (providing counsel
in all criminal cases); S.D. CODIFIED Laws ANN. § 23-2-1 (1995) (providing counsel
to retain option of incarceration for longer than six months); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 40-2002, 40-2003 (1994) (providing counsel where defendant is in 'Jeopardy of
incarceration"); TEX. CRM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 26.04 (West 1993) (providing
counsel for any felony or misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, §§ 5201, 5231 (1994) (providing counsel in any misdemeanor punish-
able by any period of imprisonment or fine over $1,000 unless prior determination
that imprisonment or fine over $1,000 will not be imposed); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 19.2-157, 19.2-160 (Michie 1995) (providing counsel for all misdemeanors for
which penalty may be confinement in jail); W. VA. CODE § 62-3-la (1995) (provid-
ing counsel to persons under indictment for crime); Wvo. STAT. § 7-6-102(a)(v)
(1994) (providing that defendants are entitled to appointed counsel where incar-
ceration is "a practical possibility"); ARr. R. CiuM. P. 8.2(b) (providing for counsel
in all criminal cases except in misdemeanor cases where court determines that
under no circumstances will conviction result in imprisonment); ARiz. R. CRiM. P.
6.1 (b) (providing counsel in any criminal proceedings that could result in punish-
ment by loss of liberty, or where court determines that interest of justice so re-
quires); FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.111(b) (providing for counsel in all prosecutions
punishable by imprisonment); Ky. R. CRM. P. § 3.05 (providing counsel for all
offenses "punishable by confinement"); MAss. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:10 (providing
counsel for any crime for which sentence of imprisonment may be imposed); N.D.
R. CRM. P. 44 (providing counsel in all nonfelony cases unless magistrate deter-
mines that sentence upon conviction will not include imprisonment); PA. R. CRIM.
P. § 316(a)-(c) (providing for counsel in all criminal cases); RI. ST. DIST. CT. R.
CR. P. 15 (Dist. Ct.) (providing counsel to retain option of incarceration for longer
than six months); WASH. JUSTICE COURT CRiM. R. 2.11 (a) (1) (providing counsel in
all criminal offenses punishable by loss of liberty).
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Baldasar via independent state grounds. 160
In conclusion, given the clarity and workability of the dissent's rule in
Nichols, and its closer adherence to the principles "born of Gideon and an-
nounced in Argersinger," it may have been better to simply clarify, rather
than overrule Baldasar.61
Kerry R. Northup
160. Thus far, all the states faced with the issue have fallen into lock-step with
Nichols. See State v. Delacruz, 899 P.2d 1042 (Kan. 1995) (holding that prior, un-
counseled misdemeanor conviction may be used to enhance sentence); State v.
Hansen, No. 94-584, 1995 WL 567010 (Mont. June 15, 1995) (same); State v. Stew-
art, 892 P.2d 1013 (Or. 1995) (same); Garcia v. State, No. 13-93-670-CR, 1995 WL
515538 (Tx. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1995) (same); Griswold v. Commonwealth, No.
2269-92-2, 1995 WL 519192 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1995) (same); State v. Hopkins,
453 S.E.2d 317 (W. Va. 1994) (same); State v. Schoenick, 532 N.W.2d 470 (Wis.
1995) (same).
161. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1935 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). For a discussion of
whether the majority or dissenting opinion more closely adheres to Sixth Amend-
ment precedent, see supra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
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